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ABOLISH THE JUVENILE COURT:
YOUTHFULNESS, CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AND SENTENCING
POLICY
BARRY C. FELD*

I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past three decades, judicial decisions, legislative
amendments, and administrative changes have transformed the
juvenile court from a nominally rehabilitative social welfare

agency into a scaled-down, second-class criminal court for young
people.! These reforms have converted the historical ideal of
the juvenile court as a social welfare institution into a penal sys-

tem that provides young offenders with neither therapy nor justice.
The substantive and procedural convergence between
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the con. Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
Ph.D. (Sociology), Harvard University, 1973; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1969;
B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1966.
I am very grateful to Tom Bernard, Donna Bishop, Jeffrey Fagan, James Jacobs,
Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Stephen Morse, Irene Rosenberg, Elizabeth Scott, Michael
Tonry, Andrew von Hirsch, and Frank Zimring for reviewing an earlier incarnation of
this article and generously suggesting ways to improve it. Of course, they bear no responsibility for my failure to heed their wise counsel. I presented an earlier version of
this paper at theJohn D. and Katherine T. MacArthur Foundation Conference on the
Future of the Juvenile Court, at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, on
May 19, 1997.
I See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizingthe AmericanJuvenile Court, 17 CRIME & JUST. 197
(1993) (analyzing changes in procedure, jurisdiction, and jurisprudence of juvenile
courts) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizingthe AmericanJuvenile Court]; Barry C. Feld, The
Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REv. 691 (1991) (summary of procedural and substantive convergence between juvenile and criminal courts) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation ofJuvenile Court]; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principleof Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821
(1988) (punitive juvenile court sentencing practices) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment,
Treatment]; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative
Changes inJuvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987) (punitive
policies in waiver statutes) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes]; Barry C. Feld,
CriminalizingJuvenileJustice: Rules of ProcedureforJuvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141
(1984) (procedural convergence between juvenile and criminal courts) [hereinafter
Feld, CriminalizingJuvenileJustice].
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ceptual and operational differences in strategies of criminal social control for youths and adults. No compelling reasons exist
to maintain separate from an adult criminal court, a punitive juvenile court whose only remaining distinctions are its persisting
procedural deficiencies. Rather, states should abolish juvenile
courts' delinquency jurisdiction and formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in the sentencing of younger
criminal offenders. Such a policy would provide younger offenders with substantive protections comparable to those afforded by juvenile courts, assure greater procedural regularity
in the determination of guilt, and avoid the disjunctions in social control caused by maintaining two duplicative and inconsistent criminal justice systems.
My proposal focuses only on the criminal delinquency jurisdiction of juvenile courts because youth crime and violence
provide the impetus for most of the current public anxiety and
political responses.2 First, this article will describe briefly the
transformation of the juvenile court from a social welfare
agency into a deficient criminal court. Second, it will analyze
the inherent and irreconcilable contradictions between attempting to combine social welfare and penal social control in the juvenile court. Finally, once a state separates social welfare from
criminal social control, no role remains for a separate juvenile
court for delinquency matters. Rather, a state could try all offenders in one integrated criminal court, albeit with modifications to respond to the youthfulness of younger defendants.
Adolescent developmental psychology, criminal law jurisprudence, and sentencing policy provide rationale to formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor when sentencing
younger offenders. Moreover, the uncoupling of social welfare
from criminal social control also suggests a social policy agenda
more responsive to the needs of youth than the current version
of the juvenile court.
In Part II, I briefly analyze the social hist6ry of the juvenile
court and its subsequent constitutional domestication. I argue
that in the three decades since Gault, legal changes have altered
2Barry C. Feld, Volent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study ofJuvenileJustice
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. Rrv. 965 (1995) (analyzing effect of increase in youth violence of
late 1980s on juvenile justice reforms) [hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth]; see also

HowARD N. SNYER & MEuSSA SIcaMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcrIMs: A

NATIONAL REPORT (1995).
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juvenile courts' procedures, jurisdiction, and jurisprudence, and
increasingly render juvenile courts indistinguishable from
criminal courts. The convergence is reflected in the decriminalization of status offenders, the criminalization of serious offenders via waiver to the criminal courts, and the increased
punitiveness in sentencing of ordinary delinquents. Despite juvenile courts' increasing and explicit punitiveness, however,
they still provide delinquents with fewer and less adequate procedural safeguards than those available to criminal defendants.
In Part III, I argue that the juvenile court's deficiencies reflect a
fundamental flaw in its conception rather than simply a centurylong failure of implementation. The juvenile court attempts to
combine social welfare and criminal social control in one institution, but inevitably subordinates the former to the latter because of its inherent penal orientation.
In Part IV, I propose to abolish the juvenile court and to
formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in criminal sentencing, thereby accommodating the lesser culpability of
younger offenders. Young offenders differ from adults in their
breadth of experience, temporal perspective, willingness to take
risks, maturity of judgment, and susceptibility to peer influences. These generic and developmental characteristics of adolescence affect their opportunity to learn to be responsible and
to develop fully a capacity for self-control and provide a compelling rationale for mitigation of sentences. I propose an explicit,
age-based "youth discount," a sliding scale of developmental
and criminal responsibility, as the appropriate sentencing policy
mechanism to implement the lesser culpability of younger offenders.
Finally, I suggest a number of benefits that may accrue from
a formal recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in an
integrated criminal justice system-enhanced protection of the
many younger offenders already being sentenced as adults, an
affirmation of responsibility, integration of records, and a more
consistent sentencing policy toward chronic younger offenders,
and, ultimately, honesty about the reality of criminal social control in the juvenile court.

ABOLISH TIEJUVENILE COURT
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II. TRANSFORMED BUT UNREFORMED:

TE REGENT HISTORY OF THEJUVENiLE COURT
A. THE JUVENILE COURT

Many analysts have examined the social history of the juvenile court Ideological changes in cultural conceptions of children and in strategies of social control during the nineteenth
century led to the creation of the juvenile court in 1899. 4 The
juvenile court reform movement removed children from the
adult criminal justice and corrections systems, provided them
with individualized treatment in a separate system, and substituted a scientific and preventative alternative to the criminal
law's punitive policies. By separating children from adults and
providing a rehabilitative alternative to punishment, juvenile
courts rejected both the criminal law's jurisprudence and its
procedural safeguards such as juries and lawyers. Judges conducted confidential and private hearings, limited public access
to court proceedings and court records, employed a euphemistic vocabulary to minimize stigma, and adjudicated youths to be
delinquent rather than convicted them of crimes. Under the
guise of parenspatriae,the juvenile court emphasized treatment,
supervision, and control rather than punishment. The juvenile
court's "rehabilitative ideal" envisioned a specialized judge
trained in social science and child development whose empathic
qualities and insight would enable her to make individualized
therapeutic dispositions in the "best interests" of the child. Reformers pursued benevolent goals, individualized their solicitude, and maximized discretion to provide flexibility in
See, e.g.,

DAVID

J. ROTHMAN,

CONscIENcE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS

ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERIcA (1980) (discussing the social structural context

of Progressives' building of social welfare and social control institutions); ELLEN
RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERMENT (1978) (impact of social sciences on juvenile courts "rehabilitative" ideology); ANTHONY M.
PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977) (discussing
the social history of origins of Cook County Juvenile Court); Francis A. Allen, Legal
Values and the RehabilitativeIdeal, in THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN
LAWAND CRIMINOLOGY 25 (Francis A. Allen ed., 1964).
4
JOHN R. SUtTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLUNG DELINQUENCY IN THE UNrIED
STATES, 1640-1981 (1988) (discussing the impact of changing social construction of
childhood on juvenile justice policies);Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Casefor Abolishing theJuvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1083 (1991) (noting the social construction of childhood and its impact on juvenile
justice treatment ideology).
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diagnosis and treatment of the "whole child." They regarded a
child's crimes primarily as a symptom of her "real needs," and
consequently the nature of the offense affected neither the degree nor the duration of intervention. Rather, juvenile court
judges imposed indeterminate and non-proportional sentences
that potentially continued for the duration of minority. Progressives used a variety of state agencies to "Americanize" immigrants and the poor; from its inception, juvenile courts provided
a coercive mechanism to discriminate between "our" children
and "other peoples' children"-those from other ethnic backgrounds, cultures, and classes.5
Progressives situated the juvenile court on a number of cultural and criminological fault-lines and institutionalized several
binary conceptions for the respective justice systems: either
child or adult, either determinism or free will, either treatment
or punishment, either procedural informality or formality, either discretion or the rule of law. Serious youth crime challenges these dichotomous constructs. The recent procedural
and substantive convergence between juvenile and criminal
courts represent efforts to modify the Progressives' bifurcation
between these competing conceptions of children and crime
control.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOMESTICATION OF THEJUVENILE
COURT
In In re Gault,6 the Supreme Court began to transform

the
juvenile court into a very different institution than the Progressives contemplated. In Gault, the Supreme Court engrafted
some formal procedures at trial onto the juvenile court's individualized treatment sentencing schema. Although the Court
did not intend its decisions to alter juvenile courts' therapeutic

' See W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How AMERICANS
FAIL. THEIR CHILDREN 68-70 (1982) (discussing the selective application of parens pa-

triae ideology in a class-based society); ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 222; PLATT, supra
note 3, at 36.
6

387 U.S. 1 (1967). For analyses of the Supreme Court's juvenile "due process"

decisions, see, e.g., Feld, CriminalizingJuvenileJustice, supra note 1; Francis B. McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historicaland ConstitutionalAnalysis, 42
U. Prrr. L. REv. 457, 459 (1981); Irene M. Rosenberg, The ConstitutionalRights of Children Chargedwith Crime: Proposalsfor a Return to the Not So DistantPast,27 UCLA L. REV.
656 (1980).

' Gault,387 U.S. at 31-57.
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mission, in the aftermath of Gault,judicial, legislative, and administrative changes have fostered a procedural and substantive
convergence with adult criminal courts. Several subsequent Supreme Court decisions furthered the "criminalizing" of the juvenile court. In In re Wznship,8 the Court required states to
prove juvenile delinquency by the criminal law's standard of
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." In Breed v. Jones,9 the Court
applied the constitutional ban on double jeopardy and posited a
functional equivalence between criminal trials and delinquency
proceedings.
Gault and Winship unintentionally, but inevitably, transformed the juvenile court system from its original Progressive
conception as a social welfare agency into a wholly-owned subsidiary of the criminal justice system. By emphasizing criminal
procedural regularity in the determination of delinquency, the
Court shifted- the focus of juvenile courts from paternalistic assessments of a youth's "real needs" to proof of commission of a
crime. By formalizing the connection between criminal conduct and coercive intervention, the Court made explicit a relationship previously implicit, unacknowledged, and deliberately
obscured. And, ironically, Gault and Winship's insistence on
greater criminal procedural safeguards in juvenile courts may
have legitimated more punitive dispositions for young offenders.
0 however, the Court denied to
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,'
juveniles the constitutional right to jury trials in delinquency
proceedings and halted the extension of full procedural parity
with adult criminal prosecutions. Without elaborating upon or
analyzing the distinctions, McKeiver relied upon the rhetorical
differences between juvenile courts' treatment rationale and
criminal courts' punitive purposes to justify the procedural disparities between the two settings." Because McKeiver endorsed a
treatmentjustification for its decision, the right to ajury trial provides the crucial legal condition precedent to punish youths explicitly in juvenile courts.
Several recent juvenile justice
legislative reforms provide some youths with a statutory right to
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
9 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
'0403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
8

"i

at 552.
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a jury in order to expand the12 punitive sentencing options available to juvenile courtjudges.
C. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

In the decades since Gault, legislative, judicial, and administrative changes have modified juvenile courts' jurisdiction, purpose, and procedures and fostered their convergence with
criminal courts. These inter-related developments-increased
procedural formality, removal of status offenders from juvenile
court jurisdiction, waiver of serious offenders to the adult system, and an increased emphasis on punishment in sentencing
delinquents-constitute a form of criminological "triage," crucial components of the criminalizing of the juvenile court, and
elements of the erosion of the theoretical and practical differences between the two systems. 13 This "triage" strategy removes
many middle-class, white, and female non-criminal status offenders from the juvenile court, simultaneously transfers persistent, violent, and disproportionally minority youths to criminal
court for prosecution as adults, and imposes increasingly punitive sanctions on those middle-range delinquent criminal offenders who remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
As a result of these implicit triage policies, juvenile courts increasingly function similarly to adult criminal courts.
1. Status Offenses

Legislative recognition that juvenile courts often failed to
realize their benevolent purposes has led to a strategic retrenchment of juvenile courts' jurisdiction over non-criminal
misconduct such as truancy or incorrigibility, behavior that
would not be a crime if committed by an adult. In the 1970s,
critics objected that juvenile courts' status jurisdiction treated
non-criminal offenders indiscriminately like criminal delinquents, disabled families and other sources of referral through
one-sided intervention, and posed insuperable legal issues for
2

See, e.g., Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2, at 1039 (analyzing states' providing ju-

veniles with right to jury trial in order to enhance the punishment capacities ofjuvenile courts).
13See Feld, Transformation ofJuvenile Court, supra note 1, at 696-722 (analyzing procedural and substantive transformation of the juvenile court); Feld, Criminalizingthe
AmericanJuvenile Court, supra note 1, at 227-54 (analyzing transformation of juvenile
court from informal welfare agency into a scaled-down criminal court).
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the court.14 Judicial and legislative disillusionment with juvenile
courts' responses to noncriminal youths led to diversion, deinstitutionalization, and decriminalization reforms that have removed much of the "soft" end of juvenile court clientele. 5
These legislative and judicial reforms represent a strategic withdrawal from "child saving," an acknowledgment of the limited
utility of coercive intervention to provide for child welfare, a reduced role in enforcing normative concepts of childhood, and a
diminished prevention mission.
2. Waiver ofJuvenile Offenders to Adult Criminal Court

A second jurisdictional change entails the criminalizing of
serious juvenile offenders as courts and legislatures increasingly
transfer chronic and violent youths from juvenile to criminal
courts for prosecution as adults.' Transfer laws simultaneously
" See H. TED RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICY, PRACFE, AND LAW (2d ed. 1985)
(states traditionally treated status offenses as a form of delinquency, detained and
confined status delinquents in the same institutions as criminal delinquents); JOEL F.
STUDIES IN
NOR THIEVES:
NErrHER ANGELS
& JULIE ZATZ,
HANDLER
DEINSTITUFIONILIKInON OF STATUS OFFENDERS (1982) (observing that intractable fam-

ily disputes diverted scarce judicial resources from other tasks, and exacerbated
rather than ameliorated family conflict); Meda Chesney-Lind, JudicalPaternalismand
the Female Status Offender: TrainingWomen to Know TheirPlace, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 121
(1977); Al Katz & Lee E. Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction,the Vagueness Doctrine, and the
Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1 (1978) (concluding thatjudges exercise of standardless discretion to regulate noncriminal misconduct had a disproportionate impact on female
juveniles); Meda Chesney-Lind, Girls and Status Offenses: Is JuvenileJustice Still Sexist?,
20 CRm.JuST. ABsRACr 144 (1988); R. Hale Andrews, Jr., & Andrew H. Cohn, Ungovernability: The UnjustifiableJurisdiction,83 YALE LJ. 1383 (1974) (discussing legal issues
of void for vagueness, equal protection and procedural justice).
"'Malcolm W. Klein, Deinstitutionalizationand Diversion ofJuvenile Offenders: A Litany
of Impediments, 1 CRIME &JUST. 145 (1979) (implementation of diversion reforms and
their possible "net-widening" effects). Federal prohibitions on secure confinement of
noncriminal youths provided the impetus to deinstitutionalize status offenders. See 42
U.S.C. § 5633(a) (12) (A) (1995). Deinstitutionalization also provided the impetus to
transfer many middle-class, white, and female youths whom the juvenile justice system
formerly handled as status offenders into the private sector system of mental health
and chemical dependency treatment and confinement. See, e.g., IRA M. SCHWARTZ,
(IN)JusncE FORJUVENILES (1989); Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalizationof Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 773 (1988).
" Although the technical and administrative details of states' transfer legislation
vary considerably, judicial waiver, legislative offense exclusion, and prosecutorial
choice of forum represent the three general types of waiver statutes that jurisdictions
employ both singly and in combination. See, e.g., SNYDER & SICKMUND, supranote 2, at
85-89; PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE
CRIME 6 (1996); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JI.VENILEJUSTCE: JUVENILES PROCESSED
IN CRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS (1995) [hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE];
Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 1, at 503-19; Francis B. McCarthy, The Serious
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attempt to resolve both fundamental crime control issues and
the ambivalence embedded in our cultural construction of
youth. The jurisprudential conflicts reflect many of the current
sentencing policy debates: the tensions between rehabilitation
or incapacitation and retribution, between basing decisions on
characteristics of the individual offender or the seriousness of
the offense, between discretion and rules, and between indeterminacy and determinacy. Waiver laws attempt to reconcile
the contradictions posed when the child is a criminal and the
criminal is a child. What legal processes, crime control policies,
and substantive criteria best enable decision-makers to select
from among the competing cultural images of youths as responsible and culpable offenders and as immature and salvageable
children?
In most states, judges decide whether a youth is a criminal
or a delinquent in a waiver hearing and base their discretionary
a juvenile's "amenability to treatment" or
assessments on ,,17
The inherent subjectivity of waiver criteria
"dangerousness.
permits a variety of racial inequalities and geographic disparities
Offender andJuvenile Court Reform: The Casefor ProsecutorialWaiver ofJuvenile CourtJurisdiction, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 629 (1994) (juvenile and criminal courts share concurrent
jurisdiction over certain ages and offenses, typically older youths and serious crimes
and prosecutors exercise their discretion to select the juvenile or adult status for
youths); Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in AmericanjuvenileJustice: In
Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 267 (1991);
Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, ProsecutingJuveniles in Criminal Courts:A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRiMNOLOGY 439 (1985); Eric Fritsch & Craig
Hemmens, Juvenile Waiver in the United States 1979-1995: A Comparison and Analysis of
State Waiver Statutes, Juv. & FAM. CT.J., Summer 1995, at 17.
17 In Kent v. United States, the United States Supreme Court formalized the waiver
process, and required juvenile courts to provide youths with some procedural due
process protections, such as a fair hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social investigations and records, and written findings and conclusions. 383 U.S. 541, 554-57
(1966). Although the Supreme Court decided Kent on procedural "due process"
grounds, it appended to its opinion a list of substantive criteria that juvenile court
judges might consider. Id.at 566-67. Legislatures specify "amenability" waiver criteria
with varying degrees of precision, and frequently adopt the general and contradictory
list of factors appended to the Kent opinion.
Proponents ofjudicial waiver emphasize its consistency with juvenile courts' rehabilitative sentencing philosophy and contend that individualized judgments provide
an appropriate balance of flexibility and severity. See, e.g.,Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of ViolentJuvenile Crime, 17 CItM.JUST. & BEHAv. 93 (1990). Critics
object that juvenile court judges lack valid or reliable clinical tools with which to assess youths' amenability to treatment or to predict dangerousness. See, e.g., Barry C.
Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking UnanswerableQuestions,62 MINN. L. REv. 515 (1978).
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to occur when judges attempt to interpret and apply these vague
laws. Judicial discretion also frustrates rational social control
and confounds criminal courts' response to young career criminals. 9 A "lack of fit" between judicial waiver decisions and
The subjective nature of waiver decisions and the lack of objective indicators or
scientific tools with which to classify youths allows judges to make unequal and disparate rulings without any effective procedural or appellate checks. DONNA HAMPARIAN
ET AL., YouTH IN ADULT CouxTs: BETWEEN Two WoRLDs 102-07 (1982) (nationwide
state-by-state and intra-state analyses reported enormous variations in both the rates
of waiver and the types of cases transferred); Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper
Deschenes, Determinants of Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J.
CRim. L. & CRMNOLOGy 314 (1990) (analyzing waiver decisions involving a sample of
violent youths in four different jurisdictions, controlling for both offense and offender variables, and concluding that no uniform criteria guided transfer decisions).
Within a single jurisdiction, judges cannot administer, interpret, or apply discretionary waiver statutes consistently from county to county or from court to court. See
Barry C. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases:Reflections on Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers,Judicial
Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 J.L. & INEQUAITY 1, 41-46 (1989) (rural judges
waive jurisdiction over youths more readily than urban judges transfer similarlysituated offenders); Tammy Meredith Poulos & Stan Orchowsky, SeriousJuvenile Offenders: Predictingthe Probability of Transfer to Criminal Court, 40 CRIME & DEuNQ. 3, 14
(1994).
Marcy Podkopacz and I analyzed waiver decisions by several judges in a single judicial locale and reported that "the various judges within the same urban county and
court applied the same law and decided cases of similarly-situated offenders significantly differently." Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld,Judicial WaiverPoliy
and Practice:Persistence,Seriousness and Race, 14J.L. & INEQUA=TY 73, 172 (1995) [hereinafter Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy]. These judicial differences influenced both the characteristics of youths waived or retained and the subsequent
sentences imposed upon them as juveniles or adults. See also Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study ofJudicial Waiver, 86 J.
CRIm. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 449 (1996) [hereinafter Podkopacz & Feld, End ofthe Line].
In addition to justice by geography and by judicial idiosyncrasy, a youth's race also
may affect waiver decisions. See, e.g., Feld, Vwlent Youth, supra note 2, at 1009-10; Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the Judicial TransferDecision: Prosecuting Violent
Youth in Criminal Cour 33 CRIME & DEuNQ. 259, 263 (1987) (study of violent youths
finding substantial disparities in the rates of transfers of minority and white offenders); Joel P. Eigen, The Determinants and Impact ofJursdictionalTransfer in Philadelphia,
in READINGS iN PUBLic POLIcY (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981); Joel P. Eigen, Punishing
Youth Homicide Offenders in Philadelphia,72J. Cm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1072 (1981) (inter-racial effect in transfer decisions in Philadelphia, judges waived more readily black
youths with white victims than other offender-victim patterns). A four state analysis in
which the effects of race on judicial waiver decisions would be controlled found that
"blacks were more likely than whites to have their cases waived for violent, property,
and drug offenses." JUvENaEjuSTICE, supranote 16, at 59.
" Juvenile and criminal courts' sentencing policies may often work at crosspurposes and frustrate rather than harmonize responses to serious young offenders
who move between the two systems. The correlation between age and criminal activity makes the currentjurisdictional bifurcation especially problematic because youths'
rates of offending peak in mid- to late-adolescence exactly at the juncture between
the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Moreover, criminal-career research indicates that young offenders do not "specialize" in particular types of crime, that serious

BARRY C. FELD

[Vol. 88

criminal court sentencing practices often produces a "punishment gap" that allows many chronic and active young criminals
to fall between the cracks of the two systems.20 By contrast, when
judicial waiver decisions, legislatively excluded offenses, or
prosecutorial charging decisions focus on violent young offenders, these youths often receive substantially longer sentences as

crime occurs within an essentially random pattern of persistent delinquent behavior,
and that a small number of chronic delinquents commit many of the offenses and
most of the violent offenses perpetrated by juveniles. See generally CRIMINAL CAREERS
AND "CAREER CRINALS" (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter CRImNAL
CAREERS]; David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, 7 CRIME &JUST. 189 (1986); Peter W.

Greenwood, Dfferences in Criminal Behavior and Court Responses Among Juvenile and
Young Adult Defendants, 7 CRIME &JuST. 151 (1986);Joan Petersilia, CriminalCareerResearch:A Review of RecentEvidence, 2 CRIME &JUST. 321 (1980).
2nJuvenile court waiver criteria and criminal court sentencing practices often lack
congruence. Criminal courts impose relatively lenient adult dispositions because juvenile courtjudges waived only about one-third of youths for offenses against the person and transferred the largest proportion of juveniles for property offenses such as
burglary. ELLEN NIMICK ET AL., JUVENILE COURT WAIVER: A STUDY OFJUVENI.E COURT
CASES TRANSFERRED TO CRIMINAL COURT 2-3 (1986) (in 1982, prosecutors charged only

a third (34.3%) of all youth waived to criminal court with an index violent offense, a
greater percentage with an index property offense (40.3%), and one-quarter (25.4%)
with less serious non-index offenses).
Despite the dramatic rise in violent youth crime in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
between 1988 and 1992juvenile courtjudges continued to transfer the largest plurality of youths for property offenses (45%), and only about one-third (34%) ofjuveniles
for violent crimes against the person. SNYDER & SICHMUND, supra note 2, at 154. Only

in 1993, for the first time, did the proportion of judicially waived violent offenders
(42%) exceed that of property offenders (38%). Id.at 29.
The nature of the offenses transferred and the youthfulness of the offenders affected their criminal court sentences. See PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., FACTORS
AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 12-14 (1984) (youths
benefited from informal lenient sentencing policies in adult courts); HAMPARIAN ET
AL., supra note 18, at 112 (criminal courts subsequently fined or placed on probation
the majority (54%) of juveniles judicially transferred); JAMES P. HEUSER, JUVENILES
ARRESTED FOR SERIOUS FELONY CRIMES IN OREGON AND "REMANDED" TO ADULT CRIMINAL
COURTS: A STATISICAL STUDY (1985) (Oregon judges transferred majority of youths

for property offenses rather than violent offenses; criminal courts incarcerated only
55% of the convicted youths; nearly two-thirds of the waived youths received about
the same sentences that juvenile courts would impose on juveniles with prior records
or convicted of felonies); L. Kay Gillespie & Michael D. Norman, Does Certification
Mean Prison: Some PreliminaryFindingsfrom Utah, JUV. & FAM. Cr. J., Fall 1984, at 23
(Utah prosecutors did not charge the majority ofjuveniles transferred with violent offenses; courts did not imprison a majority of those convicted as adults); MA. Bortner,
TraditionalRhetoric, OrganizationalRealities:Remand ofJuveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME
& DELiNQ. 53 (1986) (adult criminal courts sentenced to prison less than one-third
(30.8%) of 214 transferred juveniles convicted in adult proceedings); Podkopacz &
Feld, JudicialWaiver Policy, supra note 18, at 164 ("the juvenile court sentenced youths
found delinquent for non-presumptive, property offenses for terms longer than their
adult counterparts").
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criminals than do their delinquent counterparts who remain in
juvenile court simply because of their new-found "adult" status."
In response to the rise in youth homicide and gun violence
in the late-1980s, almost every state has amended its waiver statutes and other provisions of their juvenile codes in a frantic effort to "get tough" and to stem the tide.22 These recent changes
signal a fundamental inversion in juvenile court jurisprudence
from treatment to punishment, from rehabilitation to retribution, from immature child to responsible criminal. Legislatures
increasingly use age and offense criteria to redefine the
boundaries of adulthood, coordinate juvenile transfer and adult
sentencing practices, and reduce the "punishment gap." The
common over-arching legislative strategy reflects ajurisprudential shift from the principle of individualizedjustice to the principle
of offense, from rehabilitation to retribution, and an emphasis on
the seriousness of the offense rather than judges' clinical assessments of offenders' "amenability to treatment." State legislative amendments use offense criteria either as dispositional
guidelines to structure and limit judicial discretion, to guide
" Waiver statutes that use offense criteria to target violent offenders, that grant
prosecutors discretion to choose the forum, or that exclude serious and violent offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, increase the likelihood that young offenders
will receive significant sentences as adults. GREENWOOD ET AL, supra note 20, at 12-14
(when criminal courtjudges in Los Angeles sentenced juveniles tried as adults, gravity
or violence of the crime rather than the age or record of the offender determined the
sentence); Carole Wolff Barnes & Randal S. Franz, QuestionablyAdult: Determinantsand
Effects of the Juvenile Waiver Decision, 6 Jusr. Q. 117 (1989) (youths transferred and
convicted for violent crimes received substantially greater punishment based solely on
the seriousness of the present offense than did youths retained in juvenile court or
transferred as chronic property offenders); Gary Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult
Court:Processand Punishment,2 CRIME & DE INQ. 75, 88-89 (1986) (criminal courts incarcerated over 90% of waived violent youths and imposed sentences five-times longer
than those given to youths with similar offense characteristics but over whom the juvenile courts retained jurisdiction); Podkopacz & Feld, judicial Waiver Policy, supra
note 18, at 159-66; Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 18, at 485-89 (criminal courts sentenced the violent young "adults" to terms about five-times longer than
those received by violentjuveniles sentenced as delinquents).
On the escalation of youth homicide rates in the 1980s, see generally Alfred
Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to Youth Gun Viwlence, 59 L w &
CONIT'm. PROBs. 5 (1996); Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes
on an Age-Specific Epidemic, 59 LAw & CONTEM'. PROBs. 25 (1996); Alfred Blumstein,
Youth Viwlence, Guns, and the llicit-Drug Industy, 86 J. Cm. L. & CRM iNoLoGY 10
(1995). In reaction to this increase, since 1992, 48 of the 51 states and the District of
Columbia have amended various aspects of their juvenile codes, sentencing statutes,
and transfer laws to "get tough" on youths who commit serious or violent crimes.
TORBETETAL., supra note 16, at 3-4.
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prosecutorial charging decisions, or automatically to exclude
certain youths from juvenile courtjurisdiction.2
Regardless of the details of these legislative strategies, the
efforts to "crack down" and to "get tough" repudiate rehabilitation and judicial discretion, narrowjuvenile courts' jurisdiction,
base youths' "adult" status increasingly on the offense charged,
and reflect a shift toward more retributive sentencing policies.
Whether the legislature makes the forum decision by excluding
offenses, or the prosecutor does so on a discretionary basis via
concurrent jurisdiction, these laws reduce or remove both discretionary judicial authority and juvenile courts' clientele. Offense exclusion rejects juvenile courts' philosophical premise
that they can aid youth and denies them the opportunity to try
without regard to the "real needs" of the offending youth. Finally, the legal shift to punish more young offenders as adults
exposes at least some youths to the possibility of capital punishment for the crimes they committed as juveniles.24
Although legislatures and courts transfer youths to criminal
court so that they may receive longer sentences as adults than
they could in the juvenile system, chronic property offenders
constitute the bulk of juveniles judicially waived in most states,
and they often receive shorter sentences as adults than do prop2About
three dozen states recently have amended their judicial waiver statutes to
reduce their inconsistent application, to lessen intrajurisdiction disparities, and to
improve the fit between judicial waiver. TORBET ET AL., supra note 16, at 3-8. Legislatures use offense criteria as a type of sentencing guidelines to control judicial discretion, to focus on serious offenders, and to increase the numbers of youths waived.
Under concurrent-jurisdiction statutes, legislatures grant prosecutors more authority
to charge youths directly in criminal courts. Within the past decade, the use of this
waiver strategy has more than doubled to about a dozen states. Nearly two-thirds of
the states now exclude at least some serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 2, at 89; JUVENEJUSTca, supra note 16, at 8-9, 6493; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 16, at 29-32. Because most excluded offense legislation targets serious violent offenses-murder, rape, kidnapping, or armed robbery-youths identified by such provisions face the prospect of serious adult
consequences if convicted. As states continue to lower the ages of eligibility for transfer of young offenders from 16 to 14 or 13, expand the lists of excluded offenses, and
grant to prosecutors authority to "direct file" more cases in criminal court, increasing
numbers of younger offenders appear in criminal court charged with serious crimes.
24See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding imposition of death
penalty on offenders aged 16 or 17 at the time of their crimes); VICrOR L. STREB,

DEATH PENALTY FORJUVENMLEs (1987); Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty

Today: Present Death Row Inmates Under Juvenile Death Sentences and Death Sentences and Executions forJuvenile Crimes,Jan. 1, 1973 toJune 30, 1995 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).

1997]

ABOLISH THEJUVENILE COURT

erty offenders retained in juvenile court. By contrast, youths
convicted of violent offenses in criminal courts appear to receive substantially longer sentences than do their retained juvenile counterparts. 6
For youths and adults convicted of
comparable crimes, both types of disparities-shorter sentences
for waived youths than for retained juveniles adjudicated for
property offenses, and dramatically longer sentences for waived
youths than for retained juveniles convicted for violent crimesraise issues of sentencing policy fairness and justice. No coherent policy rationales justify either type of disparities. Rather,
some youths experience dramatically different consequences
than do other offenders simply because of the disjunction between two separate criminal justice systems. The transition to
adulthood also occurs during the peak of youths' criminal careers. Thus, jurisdictional bifurcation undermines the ability of
the adult justice system to respond adequately to either persistent or violent young offenders. Without an integrated record
system that merges juvenile with adult criminal histories, some
chronic offenders may "slip through the cracks" and receive inappropriately lenient sentences as adults.27
Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy, supra note 18, at 159-66; Podkopacz &
Feld, End of the Line, supranote 18, at 485-89.
2 Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy, supra note 18, at 159-66; Podkopacz &
Feld, End of the Line, supra note 18, at 485-89. See also Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2,
at 1010-12.
2Juvenile and adult criminal courts' failure to maintain centralized repositories of
offenders' prior records of arrests and convictions or to integrate them across both
justice systems may frustrate sentencing of "persistent" career offenders when they
make the transition between the two systems. See DAVID P. FARRINGTON ET AL,
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLNG CRuME: TOWARD A NEW ESEARCH STRATEGY 126

(1986) (confidentiality of juvenile records and failure to combine criminal histories
across both systems creates a disjunction that "serious offenders can exploit to escape
the control and punishment their chronic or violent offenses properly deserve"). In
many jurisdictions, criminal court judges often lack access to the juvenile component
of offenders' criminal histories because of the confidentiality of juvenile court records, the functional and physical separation ofjuvenile and criminal court staff who
must collate and combine these records, sheer bureaucratic ineptitude, and the difficulty of maintaining an integrated system to track offenders and compile complete
criminal histories across both systems. See Greenwood, supra note 19; Joan Petersilia,
Juvenile Record Use in Adult Court Proceedings: A Survey of Prosecutors, 72 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMNOLOGY 1746 (1981); CRIMuNAL CAREERS, supranote 19, at 193 (sealing and purging juvenile court records impedes criminal courts' ability to identify career offenders
and to enhance their subsequent sentences).
Despite the traditional confidentially of and restricted access to juvenile courts records, many states increasingly use prior juvenile convictions to enhance adult sentences. NEAL MLR, STATE LAWS ON PROSECUTORS' AND JUDGES' USE OF JUVENELE
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3. SentencingDelinquentOffenders
The same jurisprudential shifts from offender to the offense
and from treatment to punishment that inspire changes in
waiver policies increasingly affect the sentences that juvenile
court judges impose on serious delinquent offenders as well.
Progressive reformers envisioned a broader and more encompassing social welfare system for youths and did not circumscribe state power narrowly. Juvenile courts' parens patriae
ideology combined social welfare with penal social control in
one institution, minimized procedural safeguards, and maximized discretion to provide flexibility in diagnosis and treatment. They focused primary attention on youths' social
circumstances and accorded secondary significance either to
procedural safeguards or to proof of guilt or the specific offense.28

RECORDS 1 (1995) (about half of states consider juvenile records in setting adult sentences); TORBET ET AL., supra note 16, at 35-43. Several states' sentencing guidelines
and the federal sentencing guidelines include some juvenile prior convictions in an
adult defendant's criminal history score. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4A1.2 (1995); Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2, at 1058. Under California's "three
strikes" sentencing law, "a prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony
conviction for purposes of sentence enhancements;" criminal courts may use some
juvenile convictions to increase adult sentences. GAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (3) (West
1997); see also People v. Peterson, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1479 (1995) (using ajuvenile felony adjudication to double a young adult's sentence from 7 to 14 years). Most states'
sentencing guidelines weigh juvenile prior offenses less heavily than comparable
adult convictions and include, for example, only juvenile felonies committed after
age 16. See generally Barry C. Feld, Juvenile CourtLegislative Reform and the Serious Young
Offender: Dismantlingthe RehabilitativeIdeal 69 MINN. L. REv. 141 (1981); Feld, riolent
Youth, supra note 2. Some states, however, do not distinguish qualitatively between
juvenile and adult prior convictions and include both equally in an offender's criminal history score. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4701 (1995).
The use of juvenile prior convictions to enhance adult sentences fosters greater
procedural convergence between the two justice systems. States' use of juveniles'
prior records implicates the "quality" of procedural justice by which juvenile courts
obtained those original convictions, because juvenile courts adjudicate many youths
delinquent without the assistance of counsel and most states deny youths access to a
jury trial. See BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE
JUVENILE COURTS 54-56 (1993); Feld, CiminalizingJuvenileJustice, supra note 1, at 18990; Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2, at 1108-15; Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79
J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1217 (1989) [hereinafter Feld, The Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Court]; Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparisonof the Right
to Counsel in Juvenile Gourt 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 400-03 (1988) [hereinafter Feld,
In re Gault Revisited].
"See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
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The same public impetus and political pressures to waive
the most serious young offenders to criminal courts also impel
juvenile courts to "get tough" and punish more severely the remaining criminal delinquents, the residual "less bad of the
worst." Several indicators reveal whether a juvenile court
judge's disposition punishes a youth for his past offense or
treats him for his future welfare. Increasingly, juvenile court
legislative purpose clauses and court opinions explicitly endorse
punishment as an appropriate component of juvenile sanctions.29 Currently, nearly half of the states use determinate or
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions that base a youth's
disposition on the offense she committed rather than her "real
needs" to regulate at least some aspects of sentence duration,
institutional commitment, or release. 0 Empirical evaluations of
2In
the decades since Gault and McKeiver, more than 25% of the states have revised the statement of legislative purpose in their juvenile codes to de-emphasize rehabilitation and intervention in the child's "best interest" and to assert the
importance of public safety, punishment and accountability in the juvenile justice system. Linda F. Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality BehindJuvenile Justice Policies in
America, 5J.L. & POL'Y 223, 239-42 (1996) (detailed analysis ofjuvenile justice policy
embodied in juvenile code statutory preambles); Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV.503, 523 (1984); Martin Gardner, Punishment andJuvenile Justice: A Conceptual Frameworkfor Assessing ConstitutionalRights of
Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV.791, 809-15 (1982).
For example, states have redefined theirjuvenile courts' purposes to: "provide for
the protection and safety of the public," CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp.
1988); "protect society... [while] recognizing that the application of sanctions which
are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all cases," FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2) (a) (West 1988); "render appropriate punishment to offenders," HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1993); "protect[] the public by enforcing the legal obligations children have to society," IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1 (Michie 1979);
"promote public safety [and] hold juvenile offenders accountable for such juvenile's
behavior," KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1601 (1997); and provide similar social defense objectives. Some courts recognize that these changes signal basic changes in philosophical directions. See, e.g., In rejavier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); In
re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (Nev. 1983); State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773
(Wash. 1979); State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401 (W. Va. 1980).
" See TORBET ET AL, supra note 16, at 14-15; Feld, Punishment, Treatmen4 supra note
1, at 850-90; Jullianne P. Sheffer, Serious and HabitualJuvenile Offender Statutes: ReconcilingPunishment and Rehabilitationwithin the JuvenileJustice System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479,
500-06 (1995); Thomas C. Castellano, The Justice Model in the Juvenile Justice System:
Washington States Experience, 8 LAW & POLY 397, 405 (1986).
About half (22) the states use some type of offense-based criteria to guide judicial
sentencing discretion. Washington State adopted sentencing guidelines to impose
presumptive, determinate and proportional sentences based on ajuvenile's age, seriousness of the offense, and prior record. WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West
Supp. 1988). Mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in other states typically use
age and offense criteria to define serious offenders and to prescribe lengths of sen-
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juvenile courts' sentencing practices indicate that the present
offense and prior record account for most of the explained
variance in judges' dispositions of delinquents, and reinforce
the criminal orientation ofjuvenile courts.3 1 Despite their penal
focus, however, the individualized discretion inherent in juvenile courts' treatment ideology is often synonymous with racial
discrimination.3 2 Finally, evaluations of conditions of confinetences or youths levels of security. TORBET ET AL., supra note 16, at 14-15; Sheffer, supra, at 489-92. While nomenclatures differ among the states, these "therapeutic"
mandatory minimum sentencing laws typically apply to "violent and repeat offenders," "mandatory sentence offenders," "aggravated juvenile offenders," "habitual offenders," "serious juvenile offenders," or "designated felons." Compare ALA. CODE §
12-15-71.1 (1990), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (1993). These laws identify violent and persistent offenders over whom juvenile courts do not waive jurisdiction either because of their youthfulness or lesser culpability or complicity. More recent
legislative amendments add youths whom prosecutors charge with crimes involving
firearms or those who commit violent or drug crimes on school grounds to those eligible for "special" sentences. See, e.g., ARI. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(c) (Michie 1989).
The rate at which states amend their juvenile sentencing laws appears to have accelerated. "Since 1992, 15 States and the District of Columbia have added or modified
statutes that provide for a mandatory minimum period of incarceration of juveniles
committing certain violent or other serious crimes." TORBET ET AL., supra note 16, at
14. Similarly, the departments of corrections of many states have administratively
adopted security classification and release guidelines that use offense criteria to specify, proportional or mandatory minimum terms of confinement. See SUSAN GUARINOGIIEZZI & EDwARDJ. LOUGHRAN, BALANCINGJUVENILEJUSTICE 139-43 (1996); Martin
Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of
Youth Corrections,5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 340 (1991).
" The Principle of Offense (present offense and prior record) accounts for most
of the variance in juveniles' sentences. Every methodologically rigorous study reports
that juvenile court judges, like criminal court judges, focus primarily on the seriousness of the present offense and prior record when they sentence delinquents. See,
e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles S. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice DecisionMaking: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392 (1996); Jeffrey Fagan et al., BlindJustice? The Impact of Race on the JuvenileJustice Process,33 CRIME
& DEuNQ. 224 (1987); Belinda McCarthy & Brent L. Smith, The Conceptualization of
Discriminationin theJuvenileJustice Process: The Impact of AdministrativeFactors and Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1986); Stevens H.
Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control, and Do Lawyers Make a
Difference?, 14 LAW & SOc'YREV. 263 (1980).
"2 After controlling for the seriousness of the present offense and prior record, individualized sentencing discretion often results in racial disparities. See KIMBERLY
KEMPF-LEONARD ET AL., MINORITIES IN JuvENLE JUSTICE

73 (1995);

CARL POPE &

WILLIAM FEYERHERM, MINORITImS AND T=E JuVENIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 39-41 (1992);
Donna M. Bishop & Charles S. Frazier, The Influence of Race inJuvenileJusticeProcessing,
25J. RES. CRIME & DEUNQ. 242, 250 (1988); Barry Krisberg et al., The Incarceration of
Minority Youth, 33 CRIME & DEuNQ. 173, 185 (1987); McCarthy & Smith, supra note
31, at 49; Fagan et al., supra note 31. In 1988, Congress amended the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act (]JDPA) to require states receiving federal funds to
assure equitable treatment on the basis, inter alia, of race and to assess the sources of
over-representation of minorities in juvenile detention facilities and institutions. 42
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ment and treatment effectivenesse belie any therapeutic "alternative purpose" to juvenile incarceration. In short, all of
U.S.C. § 5633(a) (16) (1993). In response to theJJDPA mandate, a number of states
examined and found racial disparities in their juvenile justice systems. BARRY
KRIsBERG &JAMES AUSTIN, REINVENTINGJUVENILEJUSTICE 122-34 (1993); Carl E. Pope,
RacialDisparitiesinjuvenileJusticeSystem, 5 OVERCROWDED TIMES 1, 5 (1994) (after controlling for legal variables, 41 of 42 states found minority youths over-represented in
secure detention facilities; 13 of 13 states that analyzed other phases ofjuvenile justice
decision-making found evidence of minority overrepresentation).
"Gault's decision to grant procedural protections recognized that incarceration of
delinquents and deprivation of their autonomy constituted elements of punishment.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1967). Evaluations ofjuvenile correctional facilities in
the decades since Gault reveal a continuing gap between rehabilitative rhetoric and
punitive reality.

See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHILDREN IN CONFINEMENT IN

LOUISIANA 1 (1995) (juvenile training schools confined predominantly black juveniles
in "punitive" facilities surrounded by high chain-link and razor wire fences; guards
physically abused inmates and locked them in isolation for long periods of time);
DALE G. PARENT ET AT., CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND

CORREatIONS FACaLrrEs (1994) (endemic institutional overcrowding in juvenile correctional facilities); STEVE LERNER, BODILY HARM: THE PATTERN Or FEAR AND VIOLENCE

AT THE CALiFORNiAYoUTH AUTHORriY (1986) (staff cannot protect inmates from being
beaten or intimidated by other prisoners); BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE
VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS (1977) (violent and punitive facilities

in which staff physically punished inmates, and frequently failed to prevent inmates'
physical abuse and homosexual rape of other inmates); CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ET AL.,
JUVENILE VIctIMIZATION: THE INSTrrUTIONAL PARADOx (1976) (violent and oppressive

institutional environment for the "rehabilitation" of young delinquents); KENNETH
WOODEN, WEEPING IN TIE PlAYnIM OF OTHERS: AMERICA's INCARcERATED CHILDREN

(1976).
Martinson's generally negative observation that "with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable affect on recidivism," challenged the fundamental premise of therapeutic
dispositions and the juvenile court. Robert Martinson, Wat Works?: Questions and Answers About PrisonReform, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1974, at 25. Evaluation studies provide minimal evidence that confining juveniles in institutions effectively treats rather
than punishes them or reduces recidivism rates. See generally TI-M REHABILIATION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (Lee B. Sechrest et al. eds., 1979); Steven P. Lab & John T.
Whitehead, From "NothingWorks" to "The Appropriate Works": The Latest Stop on the Search
for the SecularGrai4 28 CRMINOLOGy 405 (1990);John T. Whitehead & Steven P. Lab,
A Meta-Analysis of Juvenile Correctional Treatment 26 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 276
(1989); Steven P. Lab &John T. Whitehead, An Analysis ofjuvenile Correctional Treatment, 34 CRIME & DEINQ. 60 (1988).
Evaluations of training schools, the most common form of institutional "treatment" for the largest numbers of delinquents, report consistently negative findings.
See, e.g., MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, RESIDENTIAL FACaLITIS FOR JUVENILE
OFFENDERS 71-73 (1995) (analysis of recidivism rates of youths released from state
correctional and private facilities in 1985 and 1991 found that between 53% and 77%
continued their criminal careers into adulthood); JOHN C. STEIGER & CARY DIZON,
REHABILITATION, RELEASE, AND REOFFENDING: A REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CAREERS OF

THE DIVISION OFJUvENILE REHABILITATION "CLASS OF 1982" 8 (1991) (over half of males

(58.8%) released from Washington State's residential facilities in 1982 reoffended
within one year, and more than two-thirds (67.9%) reoffended within two years);
LYNN GOODSTEIN & HENRY SONTHEIMER, A STUDY OF THE IMPAGr OF 10 PENNSLYVANIA
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these indicators consistently reveal that treatingjuveniles closely
resembles punishing adults. A strong, nationwide policy shift
both in theory and in practice away from therapeutic dispositions toward punishment or incapacitation of young offenders
characterizes sentencing practice in the contemporary juvenile
court.
4. ProceduralJusticein juvenile Courts

Procedure and substance intertwine inextricably in juvenile
courts. The increased procedural formality since Gault coincides with the changes in legal theory and administrative pracRESIDENTIAL PLACEMENTS ONJUVENILE RECIDIVISM (1987) (police rearrested more than

half of males (57%) released from 10 residential facilities in Pennsylvania in 1984 and
courts recommitted to residential facilities or prisons about one-quarter (23%) within
two years); PETER GREENWOOD & FRANKLIN ZIMRNG, ONE MORE CHANCE: THE PURSUIT
OF PROMISING INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 40 (1985)
(most state training schools "fail to reform... [and] make no appreciable reductions
in the very high recidivism rates, on the order to 70 to 80 percent, that are expected
for chronic offenders").
Proponents ofjuvenile rehabilitation strenuously resist the general conclusion that

"nothing works" in juvenile or adult corrections. See Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146 (1989). Advocates of "treatment" offer literature reviews, meta-analyses, or program descriptions that stress that
some types of intervention may have positive effects on selected clients under certain
conditions. See GREENWOOD & ZIMRING, supra, at 70, ("we consider the 'nothing
works' conclusion to be simplistic overreaction to the empirical evidence"); Mark W.
Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquent Treatment: A Meta-Analytic Inquiry into the Variability of Effects,
in M.ETA-ANALYSIS FOR EXPLANATION: A CASEBOOK 97-98 (Thomas A. Cook et al. eds.,
1992) (positive treatment effects typically occur in small, experimental programs that
provide an intensive and integrated response to the multiplicity of problems that delinquent youths present); Albert R. Roberts & Michael J. Camasso, The Effects ofJuve-

nile Offender Treatment Programs on Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis of 46 Studies, 5 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ET'mcs & PuB. POL'Y 421, 437 (1991) (family therapy produced positive effects); D.A. Andrews et al., Does CorrectionalTreatment Work?: A Clinically Relevant and
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 384 (1990) (meta-analysis
reported positive effects when offenders received clinically appropriate psychological
treatments "according to the principles of risk, need, and responsivity"); Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of rolentJuvenile Crime, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
93 (1990) ("the conclusion that 'nothing works' may be based more on the absence
of empirical evidence that treatment is effective than on conclusive evidence that
treatment does not work"); Rhena L. Izzo & Robert R. Ross, Meta-Analysis of Rehabilitation ProgramsforJuvenile Delinquents, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 134, 141 (1990) (treatment strategies that developed juvenile offenders' cognitive skills appeared to show
positive effects); Paul Gendreau & Bob Ross, Reviviftcation of Rehabilitation: Evidence
from the 1980s, 4JuST. Q. 349, 395 (1987) ("it is downright ridiculous to say '[n]othing
works'"); Carol J. Garrett, Effects of Residential Treatment on Adjudicated Delinquents: A
Meta-Analysis, 22 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 287, 306 (1985) (meta-analysis of delinquency in residential treatment concluded that some programs produce positive results).
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rice from therapeutic, individualized dispositions toward more
punitive, offense-based sentences. Indeed, Gault's procedural
reforms may have encouraged these changes by legitimating
punishment. These changes contradict McKeive's premise that
therapeutic juvenile dispositions require fewer procedural safeguards than do adult criminal prosecutions and raise questions
about the quality of procedural justice injuvenile courts.3
Although the formal procedures of juvenile and criminal
courts have converged under Gaults impetus, a substantial gulf
remains between theory and reality, between the "law on the
books" and the "law in action." Theoretically, the Constitution
and state juvenile statutes entitle delinquents to formal trials
and assistance of counsel. But, the actual quality of procedural
justice differs considerably from theory; a gap persists between
"rhetoric" and "reality." Despite the criminalizing of juvenile
courts, most states provide neither special procedures to protect
youths from their own immaturity nor the full panoply of adult
procedural safeguards. Instead, states treat juveniles just like
adult criminal defendants when treating them equally places
youths at a practical disadvantage, and use less effective juvenile
court safeguards when those deficient procedures provide an
advantage to the state.
a. Jury
Although the right to a jury trial is a crucial procedural
safeguard when states punish offenders, the vast majority of jurisdictions uncritically follow McKeive's lead and deny juveniles
access to juries.m Because judges and juries decide cases and
apply Winship's "reasonable doubt" standard differently, it is easier to convict youths in juvenile court than in criminal court
with comparable evidence. s7 Moreover, McKeiver simply ignored
"FELD, supra note 27, at 54-56; Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supranote 27, at 400-03;
Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, supra note 27, at 1217. See also AMECAN
BAR ASS'N,

A

CALL FoRJUS'ncE: AN AsESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALrMY OF
Puritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter
ALL FORJUSTICE].

REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (Patricia

A

mFeld, Punishment, Treatment, supranote 1, at 903-07; Feld, V'lent Youth, supra note
2, at 1099-1108.
' 7 Ainsworth, supra note 4, at 1124-25. See also PEERW. GREENWOOD ETAL., YoUni
CRIME ANDJUVENILEJUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 30-31 (1983) ("it is easier to win a conviction in the juvenile court than in the criminal court, with comparable types of cases").
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the reality that juries protect against a weak or biased judge, inject the community's values into the law, and increase the visibilThese
ity and accountability of justice administration.88
juvenile
in
protective functions acquire even greater importance
courts, which typically labor behind closed doors immune from
public scrutiny.
On the other hand, several states have recently enacted legislation to increase the sentencing authority and punishment
capacities of juvenile courts. These "blended" sentences begin
with a youth's trial in juvenile court and then authorize the
judge to impose enhanced sentences beyond those used for ordinary delinquents. New Mexico,3 9 Minnesota, 0 and Texas41
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (noting the protective
functions ofjury trial in criminal proceedings).
39New Mexico created a three-tiered classification based on age and offense. N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-2-3(C), (H), (I) (Michie 1995). Youths 16 or 17-years-old and
charged with first degree murder constitute "serious youthful offenders" whom courts
must sentence as adults. 'Youthful offenders" consist ofjuveniles aged 15 to 18-yearsof-age charged with legislatively designated aggravated, violent or repeated crimes.
All "delinquents" and "youthful offenders" in New Mexico enjoy a statutory right to a
jury trial in a juvenile court proceeding. Following a conviction as a "youthful offender," the juvenile court conducts a quasi-waiver sentencing hearing to decide a
youth's "amenability to treatment or rehabilitation" and whether to sentence the juvenile as an adult or as a youthful offender. Id. § 32A-2-20(B) (1). The court may impose either an adult criminal sentence or a juvenile disposition which extend until
age 21. Id. § 32A-2-20.
'0Minnesota created an intermediate category for serious young offenders called
Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile (EJI) prosecutions. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126 (West
1997); see also Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2, at 1038-51. The statute restricts eligibility for EMJ prosecutions to youths 16-years-of-age or older and charged with presumptive commitment to prison violent offenses, to youths whom judges decline to
waive to criminal courts and sentence instead as EJis, and to younger juveniles whom
judges determine in an EM hearing meet offense-based "public safety" criteria. Juvenile courts try and sentence these EM youths as juveniles but provide them with all
adult criminal procedural safeguards, including the right to a jury trial, because
judges impose both a juvenile delinquency disposition and an adult criminal sentence, which the court stays pending compliance with the juvenile sentence. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.126 (West 1997). Juvenile court jurisdiction continues until age 21
for EJJ youths, rather than terminating at age 19 as it does for ordinary delinquents.
If the EMU youth violates the conditions of the juvenile sentence, then the court may
revoke the probation and execute the adult criminal sentence.
4'In 1987, Texas enacted determinate sentences for youths convicted of certain
violent crimes or as habitual offenders in lieu of sentencing them either as ordinary
delinquents or seeking their transfer for adult prosecution. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§
53.045, 54.04(d) (3) (West 1996); Robert 0. Dawson, The Violent Juvenile Offender: An
Empirical Study ofJuvenile Determinate Sentencing Proceedings as an Alternative to Criminal
Prosecution, 21 TEX. TxcH L. REv. 1897 (1990); Robert 0. Dawson, The ThirdJustice System: The New Juvenile-CriminalSystem of Determinate Sentencingfor the Youthful Violent Offender in Texas, 19 ST. MAY'S L.J. 943 (1988). Juveniles receive the same procedural
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provide examples of three different versions of these enhanced
juvenile sentences for youths whom judges have not transferred
to criminal court for prosecution as adults. Although these
statutes differ in many details, all of the variants of "blended jurisdiction" provide these "intermediate" youths with adult
criminal procedural safeguards, including the right to a jury
trial. Once a state provides a youth with the right to a jury trial
and other criminal procedural safeguards, it preserves the option to punish explicitly, as well as to extend jurisdiction for a
period of several years or more beyond that available for ordinary delinquents. Thereby the state also gains greater flexibility
to treat a youth. Moreover, these various enhanced sentencing
strategies recognize that age jurisdictional limitations ofjuvenile
courts create an undesirable binary forced-choice, either juvenile or adult, either treatment or punishment. Finally, these
statutes recognize the futility of trying to rationalize social control in two separate systems. These "blended" jurisdictional
provisions represent a significant procedural and substantive
convergence with an erosion of the differences between juvenile
and criminal courts. They provide a conceptual alternative to
binary waiver statutes by recognizing that adolescence comprises
a developmental continuum that requires an increasing array of
graduated sanctions for youths and procedural equality with
adults to reflect the reality of punishment.
b. Counsel
Procedural justice hinges on access to and the assistance of
counsel. Despite Gault's formal legal changes, the promise of
quality legal representation remains unrealized for many juveniles. In several states, half or less of all juveniles receive the assistance of counsel to which the Constitution and state statutes

guarantees as do adult criminal defendants, including the right to a jury trial. Juveniles begin their determinate sentences in Texas Youth Commission facilities, and at
age 18, a court conducts a sentencing review hearing using Kent-like statutory criteria
to decide whether they will be retained within the juvenile correctional system for the
duration of their minority or complete their sentence as adults in the Texas Department of CriminalJustice. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.11(k) (West 1996). In 1995, the
Texas legislature expanded from the original list of 6 crimes to 13 offenses for which
youths could receive determinate sentences, and increased the maximum length of
determinate sentences from 30 to 40 years. Id. §§ 53.045, 54.04(d) (3).
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entitle them. 2 Moreover, rates of representation vary substantially within states and suggest that differences in rates of appointment of counsel reflect judicial policies to discourage
representation. The most common explanation for why so
many juveniles are unrepresented is that judges find that they
waived their right to counsel.43 Courts typically use the adult legal standard of "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" under the
"totality of the circumstances" to gauge the validity of juveniles'
waivers of rights." Because juveniles possess less ability than
adults to deal effectively with the legal system,4 formal equality
results in practical procedural inequality.

III. THE INHERENT

CONTRADICTION OF THEJUVENILE COURT

The foregoing jurisdictional, jurisprudential, and procedural changes have transformed the juvenile court from its
original model as a social service agency into a deficient secondrate criminal court that provides young people with neither
positive treatment nor criminal procedural justice. It effectively
punishes young offenders, but uses procedures under which no
adult would consent to be tried if she faced the prospect of confinement in a secure facility. The changes in procedures, jurisdiction, and sentencing policies reflect the contradictory roles
of juvenile courts and ambivalence about the social control of
young offenders. The Progressives sited the juvenile court on a
number of unstable cultural and criminological fault lines that
exacerbate the conflicted impulses engendered when a child is
a criminal and a criminal is a child. In this section, I contend
that juvenile courts' social welfare mission cannot and should
not be rehabilitated. In the next section, I advocate abolishing
",See FELD, supra note 27, at 54-56; Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 27, at 40003; A CALL FORJUSTCE, supra note 35, at 19-27; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPRESENTATION RATES VARIED AS DID COUNSEL'S IMPAcr ON COURT
OUTcOMES 11-13 (1995) [hereinafterJUVENILEJUSTCE].
4
A CALL FORJUSTICE, supra note 35, at 25-27; Feld, CriminalizingJuvenileJustice,supra note 1, at 169-90; Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Courts, supra note 27, at
1201-03.
"' See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) ("knowing[]," "intelligent[]," and "voluntar[y]" waiver of Miranda right to counsel under the "totality-ofthe-circumstances"); Feld, The Right to Counsel inJuvenile Courts, supra note 27, at 120103.
See generally FELD, supra note 27; THOMAS Gmisso, JUVENILE' WAIVER OF RIGHTS:
LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacitiesto
Waive Miranda Rights: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 68 CAL. L.REV. 1134 (1980).
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the juvenile court and trying all offenders in one integrated
criminal court with modifications for the youthfulness of some
defendants.
A. SOCIAL WELFARE VERSUS PENAL SOCIAL CONTROL

The juvenile court treatment model constitutes an inappropriate policy response to young offenders. If we formulated a
child welfare policy ab initio,would we choose ajuvenile court as
the most appropriate agency through which to deliver social
services, and make criminality a condition precedent to the receipt of services? If we would not create a court to deliver social
services, then does the fact of a youth's criminality confer upon
a court any special competency as a welfare agency? Many
young people who do not commit crimes desperately need social services and many youths who commit crimes do not require or will not respond to social services. In short, criminality
represents an inaccurate and haphazard criterion upon which
to allocate social services. Because our society denies adequate
help and assistance to meet the social welfare needs of all young
people, the juvenile court's treatment ideology serves primarily
to legitimate the exercise ofjudicial coercion of some because of
their criminality.

Quite apart from its unsuitability as a social welfare agency,
the individualized justice of a rehabilitative juvenile court fosters
lawlessness and thus detracts from its utility as a court of law as
well. Despite statutes and rules, juvenile court judges make discretionary decisions effectively unconstrained by the rule of law.
If judges intervene to meet each child's "real needs," then every
case is unique and decisional rules or objective criteria cannot
constrain clinical intuitions. The idea of treatment necessarily
entails individual differentiation, indeterminacy, a rejection of
proportionality, and a disregard of normative valuations of the
seriousness of behavior. But, ifjudges possess neither practical
scientific bases by which to classify youths for treatment nor
demonstrably effective programs to prescribe for them, then the
exercise of "sound discretion" simply constitutes a euphemism
Racial, gender, geofor idiosyncratic judicial subjectivity.
graphic, and socio-economic disparities constitute almost inevitable corollaries of a treatment ideology that lacks a scientific
foundation. At the least, judges will sentence youths differently
based on extraneous personal characteristics for which they
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bear no responsibility. At the worst, judges will impose haphazard, unequal, and discriminatory punishment on similarly situated offenders without effective procedural or appellate checks.
Is the discretion that judges exercise to classify for treatment warranted? Do the successes of rehabilitation justify its
concomitant lawlessness? Do the incremental benefits of juvenile court intervention outweigh the inevitable inequalities and
racial disparities that result from the exercise of individualized
discretion? These questions require more sophisticated costbenefit policy analyses than Progressives' claims that "if we save
even one child, then it is worth it." Evaluations of the effectiveness of juvenile court intervention on recidivism rates counsel
skepticism about the availability of programs that consistently or
systematically rehabilitate juvenile offenders. The inability to
demonstrate significant treatment effects may reflect either
methodological flaws, poorly implemented programs, or, in fact,
the absence of effective methods of treatment. Moreover, even
if some model programs do "work" for some offenders under
some conditions, fiscal constraints, budget deficits, and competition from other interest groups make it unlikely that states will
provide universally such treatment services for ordinary delinquents. In the face of unproven efficacy and inadequate resources, the possibility of an effective rehabilitation program
constitutes an insufficient justification to confine young offenders "for their own good" while providing them with fewer procedural safeguards than those afforded adults charged,
convicted, and confined for crimes.
The juvenile court predicates its procedural informality on
the assumptions that it provides benign and effective treatment.
The continuing absence or co-optation of defense counsel in
many jurisdictions reduces the likelihood that juvenile courts
will adhere to existing legal mandates. The closed, informal,
and confidential nature of delinquency proceedings reduces the
visibility and accountability of the justice process and precludes
external checks on coercive interventions. So long as the mythology prevails that juvenile court intervention constitutes only
benign coercion and that, in any event, children should not expect more, youths will continue to receive the "worst of both
worlds."
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B. FAILURE OF IMPLEMENTATION VERSUS CONCEPTION

The fundamental shortcoming of the juvenile court's welfare idea reflects a failure of conception rather than simply a failure of implementation. The juvenile court's creators envisioned
a social service agency in a judicial setting, and attempted to
fuse its welfare mission with the power of state coercion. The
juvenile court idea that judicial-clinicians successfully can combine social welfare and penal social control in one agency represents an inherent conceptual flaw and an innate
contradiction. Combining social welfare and penal social control functions in one agency assures that the court does both
badly. Providing for child welfare is a societal responsibility
rather than a judicial one. Juvenile courts lack control over the
resources necessary to meet child welfare needs exactly because
of the social class and racial characteristics of their clients. In
practice, juvenile courts subordinate welfare concerns to crime
control considerations.
The conflicted impulses engendered between concern for
child welfare and punitive responses to criminal violations form
the root of the ambivalence embedded in the juvenile court.
The hostile reactions that people experience toward other peoples' children, whom they regard as a threat to themselves and
their own children, undermine benevolent aspirations and elevate concerns for their control. Juvenile justice personnel simultaneously profess child-saving aspirations but more often
function as agents of criminal social control.
The juvenile court inevitably subordinates social welfare to
criminal social control because of its built-in penal focus. Legislatures do not define juvenile courts' social welfare jurisdiction
on the basis of characteristics of children for which they are not
responsible and for which effective intervention could improve
their lives. For example, juvenile court law does not define eligibility for services or create an enforceable right or entitlement
based upon young peoples' lack of access to decent education,
lack of adequate housing or nutrition, unmet health needs, or
impoverished families-none of which are their fault. In all of
these instances, children bear the social burdens of their par-
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defined juvenile courts' jurisdiction on the basis of young people's needs for social welfare, then they would declare a broad
category of at-risk children who are eligible for public assistance. Such a policy would require a substantial commitment of
social resources and public will to children's welfare. 7
Instead, states' juvenile codes define juvenile courts' jurisdiction based on a youth committing a crime, a prerequisite
that detracts from a compassionate response. Unlike disadvantaged social conditions that are not their fault, criminal behavior represents the one characteristic for which adolescent
offenders do bear at least partial responsibility. As long as juvenile courts define eligibility for "services" on the basis of criminality, they highlight that aspect of youths which rationally
elicits the least sympathy, and ignore personal circumstances or
social conditions that evoke a desire to help. Thus, the juvenile
courts' defining characteristic simply reinforces the public's antipathy to young people by emphasizing that they are law violators.48 Recent changes in juvenile court waiver and sentencing
policies to emphasize punishment, "accountability," and personal responsibility further re-enforce juvenile courts' penal
foundations and reduce the legitimacy of youths' claims to
compassion or humanitarian assistance.
A century ago Progressive reformers had to choose between
initiating structural social reforms that would ameliorate inequality and criminogenic forces, or ministering to the individuals damaged by those adverse social conditions. Driven by class
and ethnic antagonisms, they ignored the social-structural and
political-economic implications of their own structural theories
of delinquency. Instead they chose to "save children" and, inci46 GRUBB & LAZERSON,

supra note 5, at 298-300; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,

LOSING GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS IN HIGH-RISK SETTINGS 48-56 (1993) [hereinafter
LOSING GENERATIONS].
17 DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN

321-35 (1994); NATIONAL COMM'N
ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMIIES 369-90 (1991) [hereinafter BEYOND RHETORIC]; LOSING GENERATIONS, supra
note 46, at 235-56.

"' DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY
236-37 (1990) ("Of all the groups which make a claim upon public sympathy and fellow feeling, criminal offenders often seem to have the weakest claim and this is particularly the case if they are represented as a willful danger to the public, rather than
as inadequate, or maladjusted, or as themselves victims of social injustice.").
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dentally, to preserve their own power and privilege.49 "Childsaving" satisfied humanitarian impulses without engendering
more fundamental social change. As a result, the juvenile court
welfare idea espoused social structural or deterministic explanations of delinquent behavior and then individualized its sanctions. On the one hand, to punish people for behavior that
society "caused" may lead to charges of hypocrisy. On the other
hand, to subscribe to deterministic explanations of behavior
undermines individual responsibility and erodes the expressive,
condemnatory function of criminal law.
A century later, we face similar choices between rehabilitating "damaged" individuals in a criminal justice system and initiating more fundamental social structural change. In making
these choices, the juvenile court welfare idea may constitute an
obstacle to child welfare reform. The existence of a juvenile
court provides an alibi to avoid fundamental improvement.
Conservatives may deprecate the juvenile court as a welfare system that fails to "crack down" or "get tough" and thereby "coddles" young criminals.
Liberals may bemoan its lack of
resources and inadequate options, none of which address the
underlying structural causes of crime or children's poverty. But
either stance is akin to sticking fingers in the dike while the
flood of adverse social indicators of youth pour over the top in a
torrent.50 Society collectively bears responsibility to provide for
the welfare of its children, and does so by supporting families,
communities, schools, and social institutions that nurture all
young people-not by cynically incarcerating its most disadvantaged children "for their own good." Neither juvenile court
judges nor any other criminal justice agencies realistically can
ameliorate the social ills that afflict young people or significantly reduce youth crime. 51
49

See ROmmAN, supra note 3, at 288-89; PLATt, supra note 3, at 137-45.
LOSING GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 13-20; UNITED STATES DEP'T

OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES, TRENDS IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN AND YOUTH:

1996, 12-35 (1996).
"' Michael Tonry notes that:

[the resources of the criminal [and juvenile] justice system are few. The answers to poverty, underemployment, and racial bias must be sought elsewhere, in
schools and social welfare programs and broad-based social policies. To look to
the criminal [and juvenile] justice system to solve fundamental social problems

would be foolish and doomed to fail.

MICAEL ToNRY, MAuGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMNT IN AMERICA 163

(1995).
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IV. YOUTHFULNESS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND SENTENCING
POLICY: YOUNG OFFENDERS IN CRIMINAL COURTS

Once we uncouple social welfare from penal social control,
then no need remains for a separate juvenile court for young offenders. We can try all offenders in criminal court with certain
modifications of substantive and procedural criminal law to accommodate younger defendants. Some proponents of juvenile
courts properly object that criminal courts suffer from profound
deficiencies: crushing caseloads; ineffective attorneys; insufficient sentencing alternatives; coercive plea bargains; and assembly-line justice. 2 Unfortunately, these shortcomings equally
characterize juvenile courts as well. 3 Others argue that because
no social or political will exists to reform or provide resources
for criminal courts, then juvenile court abolitionists must demonstrate conclusively their irremediable bankruptcy before remitting youths to the criminal courts that inspired their
creation. 4 In short, fewjuvenile court proponents even attempt
any longer to defend the institution on its own merits, but only
to justify it by comparison with criminal courts, which they contend are worse. In this article, I do not propose simultaneously
to completely reform the criminal justice system, but rather only
to identify the sentencing policy issues raised when the criminal
is a child. Because legislatures, prosecutors, and juvenile court
judges already transfer increasing numbers and younger offenders to criminal courts for prosecution as adults, formulating
a youth sentencing policy has considerable contemporary salience whether or not states abolish juvenile courts in their entirety.
If the child is a criminal and the "real" reason for formal intervention is criminal social control, then states should abolish
juvenile courts' delinquency jurisdiction and try young offenders in criminal courts alongside their adult counterparts. But, if
the criminal is a child, then states must modify their criminal
" Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Abolitionists,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 163, 173; H. Ted Rubin, Retain the Juvenile Court?: Legislative Developments, Reform Directionsand the Callfor Abolition, 25 CRIME & DEuNQ. 281, 289 (1979).
-"FELD, supra note 27, at 283; Robert 0. Dawson, The Future ofJuvenile Justice: Is It
Time to Abolish the System?, 81 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 136, 140 (1990); Feld, Criminalizingthe AmericanJuvenile Court, supranote 1, at 259.

" Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile CourtJudge, 43

Juv. &FAM. CT.J. 1, 19 (1992).
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justice system to accommodate the youthfulness of some defendants. Before prosecuting a child as a criminal in an integrated
court, a legislature must address issues of substance and procedure. Substantive justice requires a rationale to sentence
younger offenders differently, and more leniently, than older defendants, a formal recognition of youthfulness as a mitigatingfactor in sentencing. Procedural justice requires providing youths
with full procedural parity with adult defendants and additional
safeguards to account for the disadvantages of youth in the justice system. Taken in combination, these substantive and procedural modifications can avoid the "worst of both worlds,"
provide youths with protections functionally equivalent to those
accorded adults, and do justice in sentencing.
Politically popular "sound-bites"--"old enough to do the
crime, old enough to do the time" or "adult crime, adult
time"-do not analyze adequately the complexities of a youth
sentencing policy. My proposal to abolish the juvenile court
constitutes neither a unqualified endorsement of punishment
nor a primitive throw-back to earlier centuries' views of young
people as miniature adults. Rather, it honestly acknowledges
that juvenile courts currently engage in criminal social control,
asserts that younger offenders in a criminal justice system deserve
less severe consequences for their misdeeds than do more mature offenders simply because they are young, and addresses
many problems created by trying to maintain binary, dichotomous, and contradictory criminal justice systems based on an
arbitrary age classification of a youth as a child or as an adult.
Formulating a youth sentencing policy entails two tasks.
First, I will develop a rationale to sentence younger offenders
differently, and more leniently, than older defendants. Explicitly
punishing young offenders rests on the premise that adolescents
possess sufficient moral reasoning, cognitive capacity, and volitional controls to hold them responsible and accountable for
their behavior, albeit not necessarily to the same degree as
adults. Developmental psychological research, jurisprudence
and criminal sentencing policy provide a rationale to explain
why young offenders deserve less severe consequences for their
misdeeds than do older offenders and justify formal recognition
of youthfulness as a mitigating factor. Secondly, I will propose a
"youth discount" as a practical administrative mechanism to implement youthfulness in sentencing.
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A. SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE-JUVENILES' CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Questions about youths' accountability or criminal responsibility arise at two different stages in the justice system, either
when deciding guilt or when imposing a sentence. In the former instance, questions of responsibility focus on the minimum
age at which the state may find a person guilty of an offense. In
making judgments about criminal responsibility, the criminal
law's mens rea construct focuses narrowly on cognitive ability and
capacity to make choices and excludes from consideration the
goals, values, emotions or psychological development that motivate a person's choices.5 In the absence of insanity, compulsion, or some cognizable legal excuse, any actor who has the
capacity to choose to act otherwise than the way she did possesses criminal responsibility. For questions of criminal responsibility and guilt, the common law's insanity and infancy mens rea
defenses provide most of the answers. These doctrines excuse
from criminal liability only those who lack the requisite criminal
intent, the mens rea, because of mental illness 6 or immaturity.
Because these mens rea defenses effectively excuse an offender
when the state cannot prove a crucial element of the offense,
i.e., criminal intent, the common law employs a very low cognitive threshold-knowledge of "right from wrong"-to establish
criminal guilt. Knowledge of "right from wrong" entails only
minimally rational understanding, and infancy mens rea does not
provide an especially useful analytical prism through which to
view youthfulness as a "special circumstance. 5 7 Even very young
"JAMES Q. WILSON, MORALJUDGMENT (1997); Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 273 (1968).
6Joseph Goldstein andJay Katz argue that the "insanity defense" functions to subject to social control those whom traditional criminal law principles of mens rea might
otherwise excuse from liability. Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "InsanityDefense'--Why Not?, 72 YALE LJ. 853, 864 (1963) ("[Tlhe defense is not to absolve of
criminal responsibility 'sick' persons who would otherwise be subject to criminal sanction. Rather, its real function is to authorize the state to hold those who might be
found not to possess the guilty mind mens rea, even though the criminal law demands
that no person be held criminally responsible if doubt is cast on any material element
of the offense charged.").
" In the narrow mens rea-as-capacity formulation, any criminally responsible actor
who makes a blameworthy choice deserves the same punishment as any other person
who makes a comparable choice. Mens rea for guilt or as a criminal law grading principle operates in a binary fashion either present or absent. In the mens rea-as-capacity
formula, virtually all youths over whom juvenile courts exercise jurisdiction possess
the cognitive capacity to distinguish between "right and wrong." If they do not, then
an insanity defense provides the appropriate context in which to litigate the issues of
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children may act purposefully and with knowledge of the
wrongfulness of their conduct.
Quite apart from decisions about guilt or innocence, individual accountability and criminal responsibility also relate to
questions of disposition or sentence. Even if a court finds a
youth criminally responsible for causing a particular harm,
should the criminal law treat a fourteen-year-old as the moral
equivalent of a twenty-four-year-old and impose an identical sentence, or should youthfulness mitigate the severity of the consequences? "Old enough to do the crime, old enough to do the
time" provides an overly simple answer to a complex, normative,
moral, and legal question. If political "soundbites" do not capture adequately the complexity of a youth sentencing policy,
then on what principled bases should we distinguish between
the two in sentencing?
Contemporary juvenile courts typically impose shorter sentences on serious young offenders than adult offenders convicted of comparable crimes receive. 8 These shorter sentences
enable young offenders to survive the mistakes of adolescence
with a semblance of life chances intact.5 9 The juvenile court reifies the idea that young people bear less criminal responsibility
and deserve less punishment than adults. Shorter sentences
recognize that young people do differ somewhat from adults.
These differences stem from physical, psychological, or developmental characteristics of young people, and as by-products of
the legal and social construction of youth. Adolescents differ
from adults physically and psychologically, and their immaturity
affects their judgment. A formal mitigation of punishment
based on youthfulness comprises a necessary component of a
criminal justice system in order to avoid the equally undesirable
alternatives of excessively harsh penalties disproportionate to
culpability on the one hand, or nullification and excessive leniency on the other. Youthfulness provides a rationale to mitigate
criminal responsibility. In theory, common law mens rea provides no special doctrinal
protections for youths older than 14 absent some "diminished responsibility" doctrine
which ameliorates punishment on the grounds of reduced culpability.
See e.g., Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy, supra note 18; Podkopacz &
Feld, End of the Line, supranote 18.
" FRANKLIN zRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89-96 (1982);
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD
YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 66-69 (1978) [hereinafter
CONFRONTINGYoUTH CRIME].
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sentences to some degree without excusing criminal conduct.
But, shorter sentences for young people do not require a separate justice system in which to try them. Both juvenile and adult
courts separate adjudication of guilt or innocence from sentencing, confine consideration of individual circumstances largely to
the latter phase, and criminal courts may impose lenient sentences on young offenders when appropriate.
A variety of doctrinal and policy reasons justify sentencing
young people less severely than their adult counterparts. The
common law's infancy mens rea defense antedated positive
criminology's deterministic assumptions, and recognized that
young people may lack criminal capacity. The classical criminal
law assumed that rational actors make blameworthy choices and
deserve to suffer the consequences of their freely chosen acts.0
The common law recognized and exempted from punishment
categories of persons who lacked the requisite moral and criminal responsibility, for example, the insane and the young. 61 It
conclusively presumed that children less than seven-years-old
lacked criminal capacity, and treated those fourteen-years-of-age
and older as fully responsible.62 Between the ages of seven and
fourteen years, the law rebuttably presumed criminal incapacity.63 The common law infancy gradations reflect developmental
differences that render youths less culpable or criminally responsible than their adult counterparts and provide a first approximation of a rationale for shorter sentences for youths than for
adults. Juvenile court legislation simply extended upward by a
few years the general presumption of youthful criminal irresponsibility and incapacity.
The extent to which young offenders, like adults, deserve
punishment hinges on the meaning of culpability. Respect for
the integrity of the individual provides the underlying rationale
of deserved punishment. Just deserts theory treats a free-will actor
as an "end," a sovereign person, rather than as a "means" to be
VON HIRSCH, DoINGJusTICE (1976); Kadish, supranote 55.
Goldstein & Katz, supra note 56.

60 SeeANDREW
6!

62See

infra note 63 and accompanying text.
C. Weissman, Toward an Integrated Theory of Delinquency Responsibility, 60
DENY. L.J. 485, 490 (1983); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 181, 184-85 (1977);
Walkover, supra note 29, at 514; SanfordJ. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11
WM. & MARYL. REv. 659, 660 (1970).
61 James
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manipulated by the state to achieve some ulterior utilitarian social objective, including her own well-being.r Blaming a culpable actor for her voluntary choice to do wrong and giving her
the consequences that her choice deserves respects her integrity
as a morally responsible individual. Deserved punishment emphasizes censure and condemnation for blameworthy choices.6
As long as the criminal law rests on a moral foundation, the idea
of blameworthiness remains central to ascribing guilt and allocating punishment.6 Penalties proportionate to the seriousness
of the crime reflect the connection between conduct, choice,
and blameworthiness.
Because commensurate punishment proportions sanctions
to the seriousness of the offense, it shifts the analytical focus to
the meaning of seriousness. Two elements-harm and culpability-define the seriousness of an offense. Evaluations of harm
focus on the nature and degree of injury inflicted, risk created,
or value taken. A perpetrator's age has little bearing on assessments of harmfulness.
But evaluations of seriousness also include the quality of the actor's choice to engage in the criminal
conduct that produced the harm. Just deserts theory and
criminal law grading principles base the degree of deserved
punishment on an actor's culpability. For example, a person
may cause the death of another individual with premeditation
and deliberation, intentionally, "in the heat of passion," recklessly, negligently, or accidentally.r8 The criminal law treats the
same objective consequence or harm, the death of another per-

' H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 210-37 (1968); VON HIRSCH, supra
note 60, at 49-55.
6' "[P]unishing someone conveys in dramatic fashion that his conduct was wrong
and that he is blameworthy for having committed it." VON HIRSCH, supra note 60, at
48. See alsoANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCMIONS (1993); ANDREWVON HIRSC-,
PASTORFUTURE CRIMES (1985).
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IM ISONMENT 73-80 (1974); Stephen J. Morse,
Excusingthe Crazy: The InsanityDefense Reconsidered, 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 779, 793 (1985).
67
Ernest van den Haag contends that:
There is little reason left for not holding juveniles responsible under the same
laws that apply to adults. The victim of a fifteen-year-old muggers [sic] is as
much mugged as the victim of a twenty-year-old mugger, the victim of a fourteenyear-old murderer or rapist is just as dead or as raped as the victim of an older
one. The need for socialdefense or protection is the same.
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL

QUESTION 174 (1975).
6'JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMON LAW 105-45 (1960).
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son, very differently depending upon the nature of the choice
made.
Youthfulness acquires special salience when gauging the
culpability of choices-the blameworthiness of acting in a particular harm-producing way. In a framework of deserved punishment, it would be fundamentally unjust to impose the same
penalty upon offenders who do not share equal culpability. If
young people are neither fully responsible nor the moral equals
of adults, then they do not deserve the same legal consequences
even for their blameworthy misconduct.
Responsibility for choices hinges on cognitive and volitional
competence. Do young offenders make criminal choices that
constitute the moral equivalents of those made by more mature
actors? If one focuses narrowly only on the capacity to make instrumental choices to do wrong, then we could view even very
young actors as criminally responsible. For example, a six-yearold child can act purposively to "steal" the toy of a friend even
though she "knows" and can articulate that such conduct is
"wrong." When young children make voluntary and instrumental choices to engage in prohibited conduct, they possess some
moral ability to understand its wrongfulness and require discipline to hold them accountable and to teach them the consequences of violating rules. However, despite their ability to
make reasoned choices and engage in goal-oriented behavior,
we do not regard them as full moral agents. The criminal law
regards young actors differently exactly because they have not
yet fully internalized moral norms, developed sufficient empathic identification with others, acquired adequate moral
comprehension, or had sufficient opportunity to develop the
ability to restrain their actions. They possess neither the rationality-cognitive capacity-nor the self-control-volitional capacity-to equate their criminal responsibility with that of adults.
1. DevelopmentalPsychology

Developmental psychology posits that young people move
through a sequence of psychological stages and their operational processes, legal reasoning, internalization of social and
legal expectations, and ethical decision making change as they
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pass through these stages.6 Children's moral reasoning at different developmental stages differs from that which they use at
other stages, and differs qualitatively from that which adults use.
The descriptions of the developmental sequence and changes in
cognitive processes parallel strikingly the imputations of responsibility associated with the common law infancy defense, 70 and
suggest that by mid-adolescence youths acquire most of the
cognitive and moral reasoning capacity that will guide their behavior through later life.7 ' Somewhere between about eleven
and fourteen-years-of-age, children achieve the highest stage of
cognitive development, the "formal operational" stage, in which
they can think abstractly and hypothetically, weigh and compare
consequences, and consider alternative solutions to problems.72
Developmental psychological research on adolescents' cognitive decision-making ability suggests that "for most purposes,
adolescents cannot be distinguished from adults on the grounds
of competence ....

7"sWhen youths solve problems or make in-

formed consent decisions for psychotherapy or medical treatment, social psychologists find few bases on which to distinguish
the quality of judgments made by adolescents fifteen-years-ofage or older from those made by adults in terms of eithei the
reasoning processes, the information used, or qualitative out6' SeeJEAN PIAGET, THE MORALJuDGMENT OF THE CHILD 26-28 (1965); June L. Tapp
& Lawrence Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND
THE INDIvIDuALIN SoCmXy 89, 90 (June L. Tapp & Felice Levine eds., 1974); Lawrence
Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 325, 347 (David Goslin ed.,
1969); Lawrence Kohlberg, Development of Moral Characterand MoralIdeology, in REVIEW
OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 383, 386 (M. Hoffman ed., 1964); June L. Tapp &
Felice Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategiesfor an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1974); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Children's OrientationsToward a Moral
Order, 6 VrrA HUMANA 11 (1963) [hereinafter Kohlberg, Orientations Toward a Moral
Order].
70 See supra authorities cited in note 63.
7' PIAGET, supra note 69, at 314-25; Kohlberg, Orientations Toward a Moral Order, supra note 69, at 11; June L. Tapp, Psychology and the Law: An Overture, 27 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 359, 374 (1976).
7 ROBERT S. SIEGLER, CHILDREN'S THINKING 41-42 (1986). Justice Douglas' dissent
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which exempted Amish children from compulsory school attendance laws at age 14, cited the work of Piaget and Kohlberg for the proposition that
"there is substantial agreement among child psychologists and sociologists that the
moral and intellectual maturity of the 14 year-old approaches that of the adult." 406
U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
nGary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood"forAdolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values
in PublicPolicy, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 99, 100 (1983).
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comes.7 ' Research on young peoples' ability to make informed
consent medical decisions generally supports the equation between adolescents' and adults' cognitive abilities. 75 A review of
several psychological studies of adolescents' reasoning processes
and understanding and use of medical information about their
conditions and treatment options found that adolescents and
adults generally made qualitatively comparable decisions. 76
The empirical support for adolescents' cognitive equality
with adults derives primarily from research on informed medical consent that emphasizes subjective preferences rather than
qualitative outcomes. Because informed consent policies promote patients' autonomy to make medical decisions, cognitive
psychological research focuses narrowly on youths' ability to
understand and appreciate information about risks and alternatives, and to use that information in a rational process. Moreover, most of these decision-making studies occured in a
laboratory setting in which researchers posed hypothetical
treatment scenarios and provided respondents with complete
information. It remains unproven, however, whether the ability
to make hypothetical medical decisions under structured conditions constitutes adult-equivalent competence, judgment, and
responsibility in other contexts which focus on objective outcomes rather than subjective preferences or in real-life situations with actual consequences. 77 For purposes of formulating a
71Id. at 100-01; Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A Problem in Law
and Social Science in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 15 (Gary B. Melton et al.
eds., 1983).
7'See Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEv. 1589, 1595 (1982) (fourteenyear-olds' choices did not differ significantly from those of adults in terms of comprehension, understanding of alternatives, rational reasoning, and decision making processes when responding to medical and psychological treatment hypotheticals);
Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 423 (1978) (little research evidence exists that adolescents
aged 15 or older possess less competence than adults to provide knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary informed consent).
76 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking,37
VILL.
L. REV. 1607, 1627-30 (1992).
77 Id. at 1626; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity ofJudgment in
Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
249, 250 (1996) [hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment] ("the informed consent model is too narrow in scope to adequately illuminate differences between adolescents' and adults' decision-making, because it overemphasizes cognitive
functioning (e.g., capacity for thinking, reasoning, understanding) and minimizes the
importance of noncognitive, psychosocial, variables that influence the decision-
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youth sentencing policy, the claims of some developmental psychologists that adolescents' cognitive competency approximates
that of adults proves too much. "Get tough" proponents then
could argue that they should be punished for crimes just like
adults.
Many developmental psychologists question the appropriateness of advocating for presumptive legal equality based on
adolescents' cognitive parity with adults to' make informed
medical decisions.7 8 Cognitive capacity alone does not comprise
the only relevant dimension on which policymakers can distinguish between young people and adults. More recent research
indicates that child development occurs more continuously and
gradually, rather than as an all-or-nothing invariant stage and
sequence, and that young people use different reasoning processes simultaneously in different task domains.9 Youths' developmental skills and knowledge may accrue unevenly in different
task areas rather than as a uniform increase in overall capacity.
Moreover, differences in language ability, knowledge, experience, and culture affect the ages at which different individuals'
various competencies emerge. s A comprehensive analytical review of developmental psychological research concludes that
while those findings undermine support for the treatment of
adolescents as incompetent and categorically different from
adults, they do not support the converse proposition that young
people and adults therefore function equally and that no legally
significant differences exist between them."'
making process"). See also Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive
and Affective Influence on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEmI,. L. REv. 1763 (1995)
[hereinafter Cauffman & Steinberg, Adolescent Decision-Making].
See William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and
Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSyCHOL. 895, 897-98 (1989); Scott, supra note 76, at
1631; Elizabeth Scott et al., EvaluatingAdolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19
LAW & HUM. BluAv. 221, 224 (1995).
' See SiEGLER, supra note 72, at 344-81; Gardner et al., supra note 78, at 898; Scott,
supra note 76, at 1632.
goThomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental Perspective 20 LAw & HUM. BEsAV. 229, 233 (1996) ("Progress toward completion of cognitive and moral developmental stages can be detoured or delayed by cultural,
intellectual, and social disadvantages.").
8 Scott, supra note 76, at 1633. Current research "certainly casts doubt on the presumption that adolescent reasoning and understanding are inferior. Our current
state of knowledge is far too inconclusive, however, to support a positive claim that no
differences distinguish adolescent and adult decisionmaking, and that the research
findings themselves dictate a direction for legal policy." Id. at 1635-36.
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Even a youth fourteen-years-of-age or older who abstractly
knows "right from wrong," who understands intentionality, and
who possesses the requisite criminal mens rea for a finding of
guilt still deserves neither the blame nor the comparable punishment of an adult offender. Juveniles possess less ability than
adults to make sound judgments or moral distinctions, or to act
with the same culpability as adults. Because youths possess less
ability than adults to control their impulses or to appreciate the
consequences of their acts, they deserve less punishment even
when they commit the same criminal harm. 2
Certain characteristic developmental differences distinguish
the quality ofjudgments that young people make from those of
adults and justify a somewhat more protective stance toward
younger decision-makers. 3 Attributions of responsibility involve
volitional controls-the ability to exercise self-control-as well
as cognitive capacity-knowledge of right from wrong. Concepts like psychosocial "maturity" or "temperance" provide bases
for assessing the qualities of judgment or the decision-making
competencies of adolescents compared with adults. 4 Mature
judgments result from the interaction of cognitive and psychosocial factors and deficiencies in either domain may undermine
competent decisions. Crucially, for purposes of comparing the
qualities of judgment and self-control, adolescents and adults
may differ in their breadth of experience, short-term versus
long-term temporal perspective, attitude toward risk, impulsivity, and the importance they attach to peer influence."' Three
developmentally unique attributes of youth-temporal perspective, attitudes toward and acceptance of risk, and susceptibility
"

CHARLES

SILBERMAN,

CRIMINAL VIOLENCE,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 355

(1978);

CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME, supra note 59, at 7 (adolescents are more vulnerable and

more impulsive, and have less self-discipline or capacity to control their conduct than
adults).
" Scott, supranote 76, at 1610; Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity inJudgment, supra
note 77, at 251. "[T]he intuition behind paternalistic policies is that developmentally
linked traits and responses systematically affect the decisionmaking of adolescents in
a way that may incline them to make choices that threaten harm to their own and
others' health, life, or welfare, to a greater extent than do adults." Scott et al., supra
note 78, at 227.
" Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity in Judgment, supra note 77, at 252; Cauffman &
Steinberg, Adolescent Decision-Making,supra note 77, at 1765; Scott et al., supranote 78,
at 227.
's Scott, supra note 76, at 1610; Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity in Judgmen, supra
note 77, at 258-62.
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to peer influences-may affect young peoples' qualities of
judgment in ways that distinguish them from adults and bear on
their criminal responsibility.
A developmentally informed youth sentencing policy would
emphasize qualities of "judgment" rather than narrow cognitive
capacity, ask whether young people characteristically make
poorer quality choices than they would when they are somewhat
older (because of adolescent-specific emotional, psychosocial,
or developmental differences) and reflect young people's lesser
developmental capacities. If adolescents likely will make better,
adult-quality decisions with maturity, "then the case for protecting the opportunities and prospects of that future adult from
the costs of88 her immature youthful judgment and choices seems
powerful."

2. Risk-Taking

Risk entails a chance of loss; risk-taking behavior entails
conduct that exposes the actor to-those potential adverse consequences. Young people are more impulsive, exercise less
self-control, fail adequately to calculate long-term consequences
and engage in more risky behavior than do adults. Adolescents
may estimate the magnitude or probability of risks, may use a
shorter time-frame, or focus on opportunities for gains rather
than possibilities of losses differently than adults.8 The greater
prevalence of accidents, suicides and homicides as the primary
causes of death of the young reflect greater "risk-taking" behavior.89 Teenager's greater proclivity to engage in unprotected
sex, to speed and drive recklessly, and to engage in criminal behavior reflect their taking risks with respect to health and
safety.Y
Criminal behavior constitutes a specific form of highly risky
behavior, and every theory of crime attempts to account for the

Scott et al., supranote 78, at 228.
Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-MakingPerspectiv4 12 DEwLOPMENTAL REV. 1, 3 (1992).
7

8

831!&
89

William Gardner, A Life-Span RationalChoice Theory of Risk Taking, in ADOLESCENT

PRsKTABING 66, 67 (NancyJ. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993).
'0 Scott

et al., supra note 78, at 230.

BARRY C. FELD[

[Vol. 88

age-specific nature of offending. 9' The differences between adolescent and adult decision-making with regard to risk are relevant in assessing criminal responsibility for the quality of their
choices. 92 A decision-making calculus requires the actor to identify possible outcomes, identify possible consequences that may
follow from each option, evaluate the positive or negative desirability of those consequences, estimate the likelihood of those
various consequences occurring, and develop a decisional rule
to optimize outcomes. 93 Experimental and developmental psychological literatures suggest that adolescents may approach
these various decision-making steps differently from adults.
Youths may engage in riskier behavior than adults because they
differ both in the extent of knowledge they possess and the
amount of information they actually use when they make decisions. Unlike informed consent cognitive tests conducted under laboratory conditions with all relevant information, in lessstructured, real-life circumstances, adolescents may simply possess or use less information about risks than adults.
Even when adolescents possess and use comparable information, they may assign different subjective values to the alternative consequences. Youths' developmentally influenced costbenefit calculus may cause them to weigh benefits and consequences differently and to discount negative future consequences in ways that may systematically skew the quality of their
choices. In some instances, youths simply may perceive risky
behavior as posing lower probabilities of eventuating than do
adults.94 In others cases, youths' subjective valuations of risks
and consequences may cause them to make different choices
than do adults. 95 Adolescents may weigh the negative conse91 See, e.g., MICHAEL P- GOTTFEDSON

& TRAvIs

HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME

124-44 (1990).
92 An extensive review of the empirical literature on risk-taking and cognitive development reports "mixed results regarding the degree to which adolescents may be
taking more risks than other age level[s]," and cautions that "we know very little
about either overall decision-making competence among adolescence or the development of specific skills that are necessary for or that facilitate effective decisionmaking." Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 87, at 38. See also Grisso, supra note 80, at
232-35.

"See also Grisso, supranote 80, at 232-35.
' Furby and Beyth-Marom speculate that "adolescents [may] judge some negative
consequences in the distant future to be of lower probability than do adults or to be
of less importance than adults do." Furby & Beyth-Marom, supranote 87, at 19.
95 Id.
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quences of not engaging in risky behaviors differently than
adults. For example, saying "no" to drugs may not mean the
same thing to a teen-ager seeking peer acceptance and good
feelings as it does to an adult with greater appreciation of the
risks of drugs and more to lose from involvement in the justice
system. Similarly, an adolescent's decision to participate with
friends in a robbery may reflect a different risk-calculus than an
adult's in terms of a greater emphasis on short-term benefits
versus long-term negative legal consequences. 96 Youths' impulsitivity, unrealistic optimism, or feelings of "invulnerability" and
"immortality" also may contribute to risk-taking behavior.
Rational choice theory also helps to account for adolescents' greater propensity for risk-taking.98 People make utilitymaximizing choices within a context of constraints, and people
at different stages of their lives will make different valuations of
uncertain future events. Knowledge about one's self, social environment, and life-course trajectory increase with age and affect a person's short-term versus long-term calculus. Because
young people have much less clarity about their futures than do
adults, "a focus on the immediate rather than the long-term
consequences of a decision is a rational response to uncertainty
about the future."99 As a result, young people may discount the
negative value of future consequences because they have more
difficulty than adults in integrating a future consequence into
their more limited experiential baseline. Thus, adolescents may
discount the cost of longer-term future consequences and weigh
shorter-term benefits more heavily than adults.1 00
Another developmental perspective for assessing adolescent
risk-taking emphasizes temperanceor the ability to limit impulsivity and evaluate a situation thoroughly.'O Developmental psyet al., supranote 78, at 234.
"Lawrence D. Cohn et al., Risk-Perception:Differences Between Adolescents and Adults,
14 HEALTH PSYCHOL 217, 221 (1995) (adolescents engage in health-threatening activities because they do not regard such behavior as extremely risk or unsafe, rather
than because of unique feelings of invulnerability); Furby & Beyth-Marom, supranote
87, at 19-21.
"Gardner, supra note 89, at 70.
9 Id. at 77.
100William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational
Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 18-19 (W. Gardner et al.
eds., 1991).
11 Steinberg & Cauffrnan, Maturity inJudgment, supranote 77, at 258-62.
9Scott
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chological studies examine ways in which adolescents' judgments may differ from adults because of their disposition toward sensation-seeking, impulsivity related to hormonal or
physiological changes and mood volatility.10 2

For example,

hormonal and physiological changes, mood volatility, and predisposition toward sensation-seeking affect the quality of decision-making and maturity ofjudgements, and cause adolescents
to experience more difficulty controlling their impulses than
adults. 0 3 Because adolescents' predisposition to risk-taking reflects generic developmental processes rather than malevolent
personal choices, it provides one sentencing policy rationale to
protect the adult that the youth eventually will become from the
detrimental consequences of immature decisions.
3. Peer Group Influences

Adolescents respond to peer group influences more readily
than adults because of the crucial role peer relationships play in
identity formation.04 Youth's greater desire for acceptance and
approval renders them more susceptible to peer influences as
they adjust their behavior and attitudes to conform to those of
their contemporaries. °5 Significantly, young people "commit
crimes, as they live their lives, in groups."1 8 Police arrest a
larger proportion of two or more juveniles for involvement in a
single criminal event than they do adults.0 7 Young peoples' developmentally greater susceptibility to peer group influences
and group process dynamics than their older counterparts lessens, but does not excuse, their criminal responsibility. It takes
time, experience, and opportunities for young people to develop the capacity for autonomous judgments and resistance to
the influences of peers. Because the group-nature of youth
crime renders all equally as a criminally liable, it poses a chalo See generally Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity in Judgment, supra note 77; Cauffman & Steinberg, Adolescent Decision-Making,supra note 77.
" Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity inJudgment, supra note 77; Cauffman & Steinberg, Adolescent Decision-Making,supra note 77, at 1780.
0' See ERIK ERIMSON, IDENTITY. YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968); Steinberg & Cauffman,
Maturity inJudgment, supranote 77, at 254-56.
" Scott et al., supra note 78, at 230. See also infra notes 144-47 and accompanying
text.
1

0 Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Se-

cret, 72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867 (1981).
'07id

See also SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 2, at 47.
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lenge to formulate a youth sentencing policy that recognizes differential participation and culpability of different adolescent
members of a group.
4. Reduced Culpability
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,"8 the Supreme Court analyzed
the criminal responsibility of young offenders and provided additional support for shorter sentences for reduced culpability
even for youths older than the common law infancy threshold of
age fourteen. Thompson presented the issue whether executing
an offender for a heinous murder conmitted when he was fifteen-years-old violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
"cruel and unusual punishments." In vacating Thompson's
capital sentence, the plurality concluded that "a young person is
not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty."1°9
Although the Court provided several rationales for its decision, it explicitly concluded that juveniles are less culpable for
their crimes than are their adult counterparts.1 Significantly,
even though the Court found Thompson responsible for his
crime, it concluded that he could not be punished as severely as
an adult, simply because of his age.11'
The Thompson Court emphasized that even though youths
may inflict blameworthy harms, the culpability of their choice is

"3487 U.S. 815 (1988).
'0 Id. at 822-23.
" Id at 833-34. The Thompson Court emphasized that deserved punishment must
reflect individual culpability and concluded that "it]here is also broad agreement on
the proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than
adults." Id at 834. Earlier juvenile death penalty decisions also emphasized the
youthfulness of an offender as a mitigating factor at sentencing. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court noted that "justas the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing." 455 U.S.
104, 116 (1982).
. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834. The Court stated:
[Y] outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when
aperson may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our
history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in
their earler years,generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Partcularly
"during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgement expected of adults.... The
Court has a ready enorsed the proposition that less culpabiliy should attach to a
cnme committed by ajuvenile than to a comparable crime committed b, an adul
Id- at 834-35 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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less than that of adults." The Court cited numerous other areas of life (e.g., serving on a jury, voting, marrying, driving, and
drinking), as instances in which the legal system treated adolescents differently from adults because of juveniles' lack of experience and judgment.' 3 In all of those cases, the Court noted,
the state acts paternalistically and imposes legal disabilities because of youths' presumptive incapacity to "exercise choice
freely and rationally.""14 The Court emphasized that it would be
both inconsistent and ironic suddenly to find juveniles the
equals of adult for purposes of capital punishment."'
Subsequently, in Stanford v. Kentucky, a different plurality of
the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty for youths who
were sixteen or seventeen at the time of their offenses, although
a majority of all states bar the practice. 6 While recognizing that
juveniles as a class possess less culpability than adults, the Court
decided Stanford on the narrow grounds that no clear national
consensus exists that such executions violated "evolving standards of decency" in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
7
against "cruel and unusual" punishment.
5. Subjective Time

Quite apart from differences in culpability, because of differences in their "time perspective," juveniles deserve less severe
punishment than do adults for comparable criminal harms. Although we measure penalties in units of time--days, months, or
years-youths and adults subjectively and objectively conceive of

,' Id. at 835. The Court noted:
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to
evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she
is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an
adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.
Id.
113 d

n.Id. at 823-25.

"'Id. The Court noted that "the very assumptions we make about our children
when we legislate on their behalf tells us that it is likely cruel, and certainly unusual,
to impose on a child a punishment that takes as its predicate the existence of a fully
rational, choosing agent." Id.

n'492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
Id. at 380.

17
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and experience similar lengths of time differently.'18 The developmental progression in thinking about and experiencing
time-future time perspective and present duration-follows a
developmental sequence that affects the evolution of judgment
and criminal responsibility. The ability to project events and
consequences into the future evolves gradually during adolescence into early adulthood." 9 Without a mature appreciation of
future time, juveniles less fully understand or appreciate the
consequences of their acts, may give excess weight to immediate
goals, and, as a result, engage in riskier behavior. Because
youths do not perceive present time duration equivalently with
adults, a policy of "adult crime, adult time," which imposes
equal sentences on adults and juveniles, would be disproportionately more severe for the latter. Because of developmental
differences, time seems to pass more slowly when we are
younger. Consequently, youths experience objectively equal
punishment subjectively as more severe. While a three-month
sentence may seem lenient for an adult offender, for a child it
represents the equivalent of an entire summer vacation-a long
period of time. Because young people depend upon their families, sentences of home removal or confinement are more developmentally disruptive than they would be for more formed
and independent adults.120
6. Toward a Youth SentencingPolicy Rationale

Certain characteristic developmental differences between
adolescents and adults distinguish their quality of judgment,
psychosocial maturity, and self-control, and justify a different
criminal sentencing policy for younger offenders. Youths differ
from adults on several dimensions that directly affect their degree of criminal responsibility and deserved punishment:
breadth of experience; short-term versus long-term temporal
perspective; attitude toward and acceptance of risk; and suscep-

118

See W. FRIEDMAN, THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME

(1982);

THOMAS

COTTLE, PERCEIVING TIME: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION WITH MEN AND WOMEN
(1976); JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF TIME (1969).

Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity injudgmen4 supra note 77, at 266; Scott et al.,
supra note 78, at 231.
'2 ROBERT SAMPSON

& JOHN

LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAIaNG: PATHWAYS AND TURNING

POINTS THROUGH LIFE 95-98 (1993) (noting that positive ties to the family, the school,
and the workplace alter criminal career and life-course trajectories).
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tibility to peer influences. These developmentally unique attributes affect young peoples' capacity to comprehend fully the
consequences of their actions and their empathic identification
with others. Moreover, it takes time and experience to develop
the capacity to exercise self-control. While young offenders possess sufficient understanding and culpability to hold them accountable for their acts, their choices are less blameworthy than
those of adults because of truncated self-control. Their crimes
are less blameworthy not simply because of reduced culpability
and limited appreciation of consequences but because their lifesituations have understandably limited their capacity to learn to
make fully responsible choices.
When youths offend, the families, schools, and communities
that socialize them bear some responsibility for the failures of
socializing institutions. 121 Human beings depend upon others
for nurture; this includes the ability to develop and exercise the
moral capacity for constructive behavior. The capacity for selfcontrol and self-direction is not a matter of moral luck or good
fortune, but a socially constructed developmental process that
provides young people with the opportunity to develop a moral
character. Zimring describes the "semi-autonomy" of adolescence as a "learner's permit" that gives youths the opportunity
to make choices and to learn to be responsible but without suf22
fering fully the long-term consequences of their mistakes.
The ability to make responsible choices is learned behavior, and
the dependent status of youth systematically deprives them of
chances to learn to be responsible. Inevitably, when we grant
young people autonomy in order to learn to make mature
judgments, they will abuse that trust. Young peoples' socially
constructed life situation understandably limits their capacity to
develop self-control, restricts their opportunities to learn and
exercise responsibility, and supports a partial reduction of
criminal responsibility. Adolescence itself limits opportunities
fully to develop and internalize responsible adult-quality deci"1'

The Twentieth Century Fund, in

CONFRONTING YoUTH CRINM,

noted that "youth

crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system which share responsibility for the
development of youth." CONFRONTiNGYoumH CRIME, supranote 59, at 7.
in ZIMRING, supra note 59, at 90-99 (stating that youth sentencing policy minimizes
the harm young persons do themselves, reduces to a minimum the harm sanctions
inflict on them when they harm the community, and "preserves the life chancesfor those
who make serious mistakes") (emphasis added).
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sion-making. Their susceptibility to peer group influences reflects truncated development of their own capacity for autonomous and independent judgment. Thus, a youth sentencing
policy must recognize youths' reduced opportunities and abilities to make responsible choices. Such a policy would entail
both shorter sentence durations and a higher offenseseriousness threshold before a state incarcerates youths than for
older offenders.
B. ADMINISTERING YOUTHFULNESS AS A MITIGATING FACTOR AT
SENTENCING: THE "YOUTH DISCOUNT"

Implementing a youth sentencing policy entails legal,
moral, and social judgments. Because of developmental differences and the social construction of adolescence, younger offenders are less criminally responsible than more mature
violators. But, they are not so essentially different and inherently incompetent as the current legal dichotomy between juvenile and criminal court suggests.
The binary distinction
between infant and adult that provides the bases for states' legal
age of majority and the jurisprudential foundation of the juvenile court ignores the reality that adolescents develop along a
continuum and creates an unfortunate either-or choice in sentencing. In view of the developmental psychological research
that suggests several ways in which youths systematically differ
from adults, should the criminal law adopt a "youth-blind"
stance and treat fourteen-year-olds as the moral equivalent of
adults for purposes of sentencing, or should it devise a youth
sentencing policy that reflects more appropriately the developmental continuum?
Shorter sentences for reduced responsibility represents a
more modest and attainable reason to treat young offenders differently than adults than the rehabilitative justifications advanced by Progressive childsavers. In this context, adolescent
criminal responsibility represents a global judgement about the
degree of youths' deserved punishment, rather than a technical
legal judgment about whether or not a particular youth possessed the requisite mene rea or mental state defined in the
criminal statute. If adolescents as a class characteristically exercise poorer judgment than do adults, then sentencing policies
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can reduce the long-term harm that they cause to themselves.s
Protecting young people from the full penal consequences of
their poor decisions reflects a policy to preserve their life
chances for the future when they presumably will make more
mature and responsible choices. Such a policy simultaneously
holds young offenders accountable for their acts because they
possess sufficient culpability, and yet mitigates the severity of
consequences because their choices entail less blameworthiness
than those of adults.
Criminal courts in some jurisdictions already consider
"youthfulness" in the context of aggravating and mitigating factors, and may impose shorter sentences on a discretionary basis.12 4

Although the federal sentencing guidelines explicitly

reject "youthfulness" as a justification to sentence outside of the
guidelines range,125 sentencing statutes in some states recognize
Under
"youthfulness" as a mitigating factor at sentencing.2
these aggravating-mitigating sentencing laws, trial court judges
regularly consider youthfulness both de jure and de facto; appel1
late courts may remand them for resentencing if they do not. 2
123Scott, supra note 76, at 1656 ("[I]f the values that drive risky choices are associated with youth, and predictably will change with maturity, then our paternalistic inclination is to protect the young decision-maker.., from his or her bad judgment.").
See also ZIMRING, supra note 59, at 90-99.
,2' Apart from capital punishment, the United States Supreme Court gives great
constitutional deference and virtually unreviewable authority to states to formulate
their sentencing policy. SeeHarmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1008 (1991) (stating
that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for
possession of cocaine did not require any "individualized" consideration of any personal mitigating circumstances). Harmelinoverruled the Court's earlier decision in
Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The Court in Solem held that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" entitled a non-capital
defendant to proportionality analysis focusing on: severity of the penalty in relation to
the gravity of the offense; comparison with sentences imposed for other types of
crimes within the same jurisdiction; and comparison with the sentences imposed in
other states for the same type of crime. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965.
,2sU.S. SENTENCING GUIDELNES MANUAL § 5H.1 (1995).
,2' See, e.g., AIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-702(D) (1) (1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.0016(4)(k)
(1996) ("the defendant was too young to appreciate the consequences of the offense"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 905.5(f) (West 1997) ("the youth of the offender at the
time of the offense"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-134.D.16 (e)(4) (1996) ("The defendant's age, immaturity, or limited mental capacity").
1 See, e.g., State v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tenn. 1993) ("[C]ourts should consider the concept of youth in context, i.e., the defendant's age, education, maturity,
experience, mental capacity or development, and any other pertinent circumstance
tending to demonstrate the defendant's ability or inability to appreciate the nature of
his conduct."); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300-02 (Utah 1993) (noting that trial

1997]

ABOLISH THEJUVENILE COURT

117

However, states that consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor
simply treat it as one element to be weighed with other aggravating and mitigating factors in deciding what sentence to impose
on an individual.
In most jurisdictions, however, whether a trial judge treats
"youthfulness" as a mitigating factor rests within her "sound discretion." Failure to exercise leniency does not constitute reversible error or an abuse of discretion, and courts impose
sentences of "life without parole" even on very young offenders. 128
Uniquely among the states, the Nevada Supreme Court in
Naovarathv. State considered whether a mandatory term of "life
without parole" imposed on a fourteen-year-old convicted of
murder constituted "cruel and unusual punishment," and included "youthfulness" as a consideration in its proportionality
analysis.'2 Because Nevada excluded young murderers from juvenile court jurisdiction without any minimum age restriction,3 0
the court asserted that there must be some young age at which a
criminal sentence of life without parole would constitute a
"cruel and unusual" punishment."' The court asserted that the
state's constitutional prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" required the judiciary to articulate "evolving stan-

court's failure to consider defendant's youthful age as a mitigating factor warranted
remand for resentencing).
'2 For example, in State v. Furman, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the
state constitution prohibited the execution of youths for crimes committed under the
age of 18, but upheld its authority to imprison them for mandatory terms of life without parole. 858 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash. 1993). In State v. Massey, the Washington
Court of Appeals upheld a sentence of life without parole for a 13-year-old juvenile
convicted as an adult and rejected any special consideration of the youth's age. 803
P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct App. 1990). The court held that the test to measure "cruel
and unusual punishment" or proportionality "does not embody an element or consideration of the defendant's age, only a balance between the crime and the sentence
imposed. Therefore, there is no cause to create a distinction between ajuvenile and
an adult who are (sic] sentenced to life without parole for first degree aggravated
murder." Id
'2 Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 948-49 (Nev. 1989).
"s NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040 (1979).
m Naovarath,779 P.2d at 946. The court commented:
Most agree that it would be excessive to sentence a nine or ten year old to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. Children of this age simply cannot
be said to deserve this kind of severe punishment, nor can it be said that a child
of such tender years is so unalterably bad that no parole release should ever be
considered.
Id-
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dards of decency.",12 The court concluded that even for the

most serious crimes, a sentence of life without parole constituted a disproportionately "cruel and unusual" penalty because
of "the undeniably lesser culpability of children for their bad actions, their capacity for growth and society's special obligation
to children.' '

33

Although the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed

the state constitutional proportionality analyses and juveniles'
reduced culpability, it provides virtually no practical protections
or limitations on the legislature's power to prescribe severe
penalties for youths. By a 3-2 vote, the court held only that a
youth must receive a parole hearing at some time in the distant
future in order for a mandatory life sentence to pass state constitutional muster.
A statutory sentencing policy that integrates youthfulness,
reduced culpability, and restricted opportunities to learn self
control with principles of proportionality would provide
younger offenders with categorical fractional reductions of
adult sentences. Because "youthfulness" constitutes a universal
form of "reduced responsibility," states should treat it unequivocally as a mitigating factor without regard to nuances of individual developmental differences. Treating youthfulness as a
formal mitigating sentencing factor represents a social, moral,
and criminal policy judgment rather than a clinical or psychiatric evaluation. Such an approach avoids the risks of discretionary clinical subjectivity inherent in individualized adolescent
culpability determinations.
This categorical approach would take the form of an explicit "youth discount" at sentencing. A fourteen-year-old offender might receive, for example, 25-33% of the adult penalty,
a sixteen-year-old defendant, 50-60%, and an eighteen-year-old
adult the full penalty, as presently occurs. The "deeper discounts" for younger offenders correspond to the developmental
continuum and their more limited opportunities to learn and
..Id&at 947. The court said:
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for a child presents an especially
difficult question .... If putting this child away until his death is not cruel, it is
certainly unusual. To adjudicate a thirteen-year-old to be forever irredeemable
and to subject a child of this age to hopeless, lifelong punishment and segregation is not a usual or acceptable response to childhood criminality, even when
the criminality amounts to murder.
Id.
1

Id. at 948.
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exercise responsibility. A youth discount based on reduced culpability functions as a sliding scale of diminished responsibility.
Just as adolescents posses less criminally responsibility than do
adults, fourteen-year-old youths should enjoy a greater mitigaion of blameworthiness than would seventeen-year-olds. Because the rationale for youthful mitigation rests upon reduced
culpability and limited opportunities to learn to make responsible choices, younger adolescents bear less responsibility and deserve proportionally shorter sentences than older youths. The
capacity to learn to be responsible improves with time and experience. With the passage of time, age, and opportunities to
develop the capacity for self-control, social tolerance of criminal
deviance and claims for mitigation decline. Several youth sentencing policy groups and scholars implicitly endorse the concept of a "youth discount" or a sliding scale of criminal
responsibility for younger offenders. 4
Discounted sentences that preserve younger offenders' life
chances require that the maximum sentences they receive remain substantially below those imposed on adults135 For youths
T

"4 AiMICAN BAR ASS'N,JUVENILE JUsTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS 35
(1980), emphasized the relationship between age and sanctions: "The age of the juvenile is also relevant to the determination of the seriousness of his or her behavior.
In most cases, the older the juvenile, the greater is his or her responsibility for breaking the law." CONFRONTING Youh CRIME, supra note 59, at 6-7, also concluded that
the law should hold young offenders accountable by age 13 or 14, at least to some degree because youths of that age "are aware of the severity of the criminal harms they
inflict and that, much as they fall short of maturity or self-control, they are morally
and should be legally responsible for intentionally destructive behavior. The older
the adolescent, the greater the degree of responsibility the law should presume."
The sentencing principles of frugality or parsimony of punishment, or the "least
restrictive alternative" also provide support for a "youth discount." See, e.g., MORRIS,
supra note 66, at 59-60; JUVENILEJUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS, supra,
at 34 ("the court should employ the least restrictive category and duration of disposition that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, as modified by the degree of
culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, and by the age and
prior record of the juvenile."); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM., JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 440 (1980) ("In choosing among statutorily permissible
dispositions, the court should employ the least coercive category and duration of disposition that are appropriate to the seriousness of the delinquent act, as modified by
the degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, age
and prior record.").
' AMERICAN BAR A S'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS 39-41 (1980), provides one example of "discounted"

sentences for young offenders parallel to those for adults. The Standards used adult
sentence lengths to establish substantive proportionality, classified all crimes into five
categories based on the level of punishment attached to them, and then provided for
substantially shorter equivalent juvenile sanctions. Other groups endorse similar dis-
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below the age of fourteen, the common law infancy mens rea defense would acquire new vitality for proportionally shorter "discounted" sentences or even non-criminal dispositions.
The rationale for a "youth discount" also supports requiring
a higher in/out threshold of offense seriousness as a prerequisite for imprisonment. Because juveniles depend upon their
families more than do adults, removal from home constitutes a
more severe punishment. Because of differences in "subjective
time," youths experience the duration of imprisonment more
acutely than do adults. Because of the rapidity of developmental change, sentences of incarceration are more disruptive for
youths than for adults. Thus, states should require a higher
threshold of offense seriousness and a greater need for social
defense before confining a youth than might be warranted for
an older offender.
The specific discount value-the amount of fractional reduction and the in/out threshold-reflects several empirical
and normative considerations.
It requires an empiricallyinformed sentencing policy judgment about adolescent development and criminal responsibility. To what extent do specific
physical, social, and psychological characteristics of youth-depreciation of future consequences, risk-taking, peer influences,
lack of self-control, hormonal changes, and lack of opportunities to learn to make responsible choices-induce them to engage in behavior simply because they are young? How much
developmental difference should a state require to produce
what degree of moral and legal mitigation in its sentencing policy? To what extent will severe, unmitigated adult penalties so
alter youths' life course that they will be unable to survive the
mistakes of adolescence with any semblance of life chances intact? Developmental psychological research provides only suggestive directions rather than definitive answers to these
sentencing policy questions.

counted penalties. See, e.g., CONFRONTING YOLTH CRIME, supra note 59, at 17 ("The
principle of diminished responsibility makes life imprisonment and death penalties
inappropriate," for example, even in cases of intentional murders by youths.); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 6.05 commentary at 25 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1957) (recommending
special provisions for "young adult offenders," ages 16 to 22, with a maximum sentence
length of four years. The "special sentence should relate to the duration of commitment ...adapted to the age of the offender.") (emphasis added).
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Only the states whose criminal sentencing laws provide realistic, humane, and determinate sentences that enable a judge
actually to determine "real-time" sentences can readily implement a proposal for explicit fractional reductions of youths' sentences.3 6 One can only know the value of a "youth discounted"
sentence in a sentencing system in which courts know in advance the standard or "going rate" for adults. In many jurisdictions, implementing a "youth discount" would require
significant modification of the current criminal sentencing statutes including presumptive sentencing guidelines with strong
upper limits on punishment severity, elimination of all mandatory minimum sentences, and some structured judicial discretion to mitigate penalties based on individual circumstances. In
short, a criminal sentencing system itself must be defensible in
terms of equality, equity, desert, and proportionality. Attempts
to apply idiosyncratically "youth discounts" within the flawed indeterminate or draconian mandatory-minimum sentencing regimes that currently prevail in many jurisdictions runs the risk
simply of reproducing all of their existing inequalities and injustices.
1. Individualizationvs. Categorization

Youthful development is highly variable. Young people of
the same age may differ dramatically in their criminal sophistication, appreciation of risk, or learned responsibility. Chronological age provides, at best, a crude and imprecise indicator of
maturity and the opportunity to develop a capacity for selfcontrol. However, a categorical "youth discount" that uses age
as a conclusive proxy for reduced culpability and a shorter sentence remains preferable to an "individualized" inquiry into the
criminal responsibility of each young offender. The criminal
law represents an objective standard. Attempts to integrate subjective psychological explanations of adolescent behavior and
personal responsibility into a youth sentencing policy cannot be
done in a way that can be administered fairly without undermining the objectivity of the law. Developmental psychology does
not possess reliable clinical indicators of moral development or
"6 See, e.g., MIcHAELToNRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 159-64 (1996); ToNRY, supra note
51, at 190-209; Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After, 75
MINN. L. REv. 727, 729 (1991); Michael Tonry, Predictionand Classification:Legal and
EthicalIssues, 9 CRimE &JusT. 367 (1987).
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criminal sophistication that equate readily with criminal responsibility or accountability.,3 7 For young criminal actors who pos-

sess at least some degree of criminal responsibility, relying upon
inherently inconclusive or contradictory psychiatric or clinical
testimony to precisely tailor sanctions hardly seems worth the
judicial burden and diversion of resources that the effort would
entail.'38 Thus, for ease of administration, age alone provides
the most useful criterion upon which to allocate mitigation.
Youthful mitigation of criminal responsibility represents a
legal concept and social policy judgment that does not correspond with any psychiatric diagnostic category or developmental
psychological analogue about which an expert could testify.
Unlike the insanity defense, 'i 9 a "youth discount" does not attempt to assess whether antecedent forces, such as a mental illness, caused or determined a young offender's behavior.
Rather, it conclusively presumes that young people's criminal
choices differ qualitatively per se, from those of adults. "Youthfulness" constitutes a form of legal "partial responsibility" without need for any specific clinical indicators other than a birth
certificate. A "youth discount" that bases fractional reductions
of sentences on age-as-a-proxy-for culpability also avoids the
conceptual and administrative difficulties of a more encompassing subjective inquiry into diminished responsibility, 140 a "rotten

See, e.g., Grisso, supra note 80, at 235; Scott et al., supranote 76, at 1630.
' The administrative experiences with the insanity and diminished responsibility
defenses in the criminal law, and with "amenability to treatment" in judicial waiver
proceedings teach that efforts to individualize culpability assessments necessarily
founder on clinical subjectivity, differences among experts about symptomology and
their effects on choices, the inability of juries or judges rationally and consistently to
assess culpability, and uncertainty about the penal purposes being advanced by the
inquiry. See; e.g., Goldstein & Katz, supra note 56, at 865; Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage,
77 COLUM. L. REv. 827 (1977); StephenJ. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished
Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 1 (1984); Feld, Vwlent Youth, supra note 2, at
1006-10.
"' See supranote 56 and accompanying text (discussing the insanity defense).
Arenella, supra note 138, at 835-36. Although "diminished responsibility" doctrines attempt to link a sane defendant's mental abnormality with some reduced degree of criminal responsibility, efforts to evaluate subjective culpability result in
inconsistent, confusing, and arbitrary applications. Diminished responsibility allows
the defendant to introduce psychological evidence about why he was less responsible
than an ordinary person as a formal mitigation of punishment, although it is unclear
to what legal formula that evidence corresponds. Id. at 835-36. See also Morse, supra
note 138, at 9-13.
137

1997]

ABOLISH THEJUVENILE COURT

social background," 141 or "social adversity."42 Defenses that rec-

ognize deficiencies of character as excuses to criminal liability
undermine the value of responsibility and encourage deterministic claims of lack of culpability. The juvenile courts' treatment ideology mistakenly denies that young people are morally
responsible actors whom the law may hold accountable for their
behavior.
A youth sentencing policy requires formal mitigation to
avoid the undesirable forced choice between either inflicting
undeservedly harsh punishments on less culpable actors or "doing nothing" about the manifestly guilty. Mitigation avoids the
pressures judges and juries historically experienced to nullify
and acquit the "somewhat guilty" or to punish excessively the
"partially" responsible. A formal policy of youthful mitigation
provides a buffer against the inevitable political pressure to
ratchet-up sanctions every time youths sentenced leniently subsequently commit serious offenses. The idea of deserved punishment also limits the imposition of too littlepunishment as well
as too much. Although the overall cardinal scale of penalties
for juveniles should be considerably less than that for adults, a
failure to sanction when appropriate, as juvenile court treatment ideology may dictate in some instances, can deprecate the
moral seriousness of offending.4 3 Indeed juvenile court judges
de facto reinstate the principle of offense and punish young offenders exactly because a treatment ideology cannot justify either "clinically" lenient or disparate, individualized sentences.
"4Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background: Should CriminalLaw Recognize a Defense of Severe EnvironmentalDeprivation?, 3 J.L. & INEQUALrnr 9, 15 (1982). A "rotten
social background" defense posits that a person raised in a manifestly criminogenic
environment-grinding deprivation and poverty, minimal parental or familial support, exposure to violence and abuse, tutelage in crime by older youths "on the
street"-cannot make the same moral choices as those born in more advantageous
circumstances and should not be held to the same degree of criminal responsibility.
142TONRY,

supra note 51, at 141. Tonry notes that recognizing a "social adversity"
defense denigrates those offenders by implying that "those people are not responsible
adults whose moral choices matter." Id. at 141-42. Since recognition of moral autonomy entails acknowledgment of people's responsibility for their willed actions, a social adversity defense cutting that link would deny the actor's autonomy. Id. at 14243. Tonry also argues that formal recognition of "social adversity" as an excuse would
stigmatize all members of the disadvantaged class to whom the defense might be
available, remove disincentives to engage in crime, and undermine the objectivity and
deterrent functions of criminal law. Id. at 146-47.
'4 Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 1, at 527-28.
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2. Youth and Group Crime
Young offenders commit crimes in groups to a much
greater extent than do adults.'" While the law treats all participants in a crime as equally responsible and may sentence them
alike, young people's susceptibility to peer group influences requires a more nuanced assessment of their degree of participaThe group
tion, personal responsibility, and culpability.'4
nature of youth crime affects sentencing policy in several ways.
The presence of a social audience of peers may induce youths to
participate in criminal behavior that they would not engage in if
alone.14 6 Even though the criminal law treats all accomplices as
equally guilty as a matter of law, they may not all bear equal responsibility for the actual harm inflicted and may deserve different sentences. 4 7 To some extent, state criminal sentencing laws
already recognize an offender's differential participation in a
crime as a "mitigating" factor. 48 Similarly, some states' juvenile
court waiver laws and juvenile sentencing provisions also focus
on "the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense, including the level of the child's participating in planning

and carrying out the offense ...

. ,,9

Thus, the group nature of

adolescent criminality requires some formal mechanism to dis-

4

Zimring, supranote 106, at 880; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 2, at 49.
"' Zimring, supra note 106, at 883 ("The pervasive problem of the adolescent accessory aggravates the difficulty of determining appropriate sanctions for youth
crime."). Zimring contends that currently, prosecutors' charging decisions and juvenile court judges' sentencing decisions attempt to distinguish between a "reluctant
but voluntary" aider and abettor and youths who bear primary responsibility. Id.at
883-84.
"' See generally DAVID MATZA, BECOMING DEVIANT (1969) (as a result of "pluralistic
ignorance" or "shared misunderstanding," youths attribute to other members of their
group a greater propensity to deviance and participate in delinquency in order to
avoid "losing face."); JAMES SHORT & FRED STRODBECK, GROUP PROCESS AND GANG
DELINQUENCY (1965) (group nature of youth crime and encouragement each provides the other).

,7See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.05 (1992) (aiding and abetting liability of accom-

plices).

State criminal laws and court opinions do not require juvenile courts to dis-

tinguish between active and "passive" accomplices either to transfer youths to
criminal courts, see, e.g., In re K.C., 513 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); In re

T.L.C., 435 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), or to sentence them asjuveniles,
In re D.KK., 410 N.W. 2d 76, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
1'4See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.D.2.a.(2) (1996) (mitigating factor
that "offender played a minor or passive role" in crime).
"9MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2b) (1992). See generally Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2,
at 1031-34.
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tinguish between active participants and passive accomplices
with even greater "discounts" for the latter.
3. Virtue of Affirming PartialResponsibilityfor Youth

In the Broadway musical, West Side Story, The Jets sing the
song, "Gee Officer Krupke," in which they invoke many of the
popular deterministic explanations of delinquency. One boy
complains that "Our mothers all are junkies, Our fathers all are
drunks," and the chorus responds that 'Wenever had the love
that every child ought a get." Another youth observes that he's
"depraved on account I'm deprived," and others' self-diagnoses
conclude that '"eare sick, sick, sick, Like we're sociologically
sick." One boy prescribes "a analyst's care! It just his neurosis
that ought a be curbed-He's psychologically disturbed."10 In
short, the delinquents readily understood cultural explanations
of criminality, invoked exculpatory appeals to determinism, and
to relieve themselves of
employed "techniques of neutralization"
15
responsibility for their behavior. '

One of the principal virtues, Goldstein argues inhis seminal
defense of The Insanity Defense, is that it dramatically affirms the
idea of individual responsibility. 52 Because the criminal law
emphasizes blame, the insanity defense attempts to distinguish
between the "mad" and the "bad," between the "sick" and the
"evil," in order to reinforce the concept of personal responsibility153 The idea of personal responsibility and holding people accountable for their behavior provides an important counterweight to a popular culture that endorses the idea that everyone
is a victim, that all behavior is determined and no one is responsible, and that therefore the state cannot blame wrong-doers.
" STE VEN SONDHEIM, WEsr SinE STORY 114-16 (1956).
..
,See, e.g., Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization:A Theory of
Delinquency, 22 AM. Soc. REv. 664 (1957); DAViD MATA, DELINQUENCYAND DRFT 69-98
(1964).
,12
ABRAHAM S. GoLDsTE'N, THE INSANTY DEFENSE 224-25 (1967).
15'
&n
1.4 Packer argues that regardless of how psychologists or philosophers ultimately
resolve the "free will versus determinism" debate, it is desirable to act "as if'responsible people make choices:
The idea of free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system, a statement
of fact, but rather a value preference having very little to do with the metaphysics
of determinism and free will .... Very simply, the law treats man's conduct as
autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed
as if it were. It is desirable because the capacity of the individual human being to
live his life in reasonable freedom from socially imposed external constraints...
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The juvenile court's "rehabilitative ideal" elevated determinism over free will, characterized delinquent offenders as victims
rather than perpetrators, and envisioned a therapeutic institution that resembled more closely a preventive, forward-looking
civil commitment process rather than a criminal court. By denying youths' personal responsibility, juvenile courts' treatment
ideology reduces offenders' duty to exercise self-control, erodes
their obligation to change, and sustains a self-fulfilling prophecy
that delinquency occurs inevitably for youths from certain backgrounds.
Affirming responsibility encourages people to learn the virtues of moderation, self-discipline, and personal accountability.
Acknowledging that we punish young offenders for their misconduct
becomes part of a complex of cultural forces that keep alive the moral
lessons, and the myths, which are essential to the continued order of society. In short, even if we have misgiving about blaming a particular individual, because he has been shaped long ago by forces he may no
longer be able to resist, the concept of "blame" may be necessary.

Because a criminal conviction represents an official condemnation, the idea of "blame" reinforces for the public and provides
for the individual the incentive to develop responsibility. A culture that values autonomous individuals must emphasize both
freedom and responsibility.
While the paternalistic stance of the traditional juvenile
courts rests on the humane desire to protect young people from
the adverse consequences of their bad decisions, protectionism
simultaneously disables young people from the opportunity to
make choices and to learn responsibility for their natural consequences. Even marginally competent adolescents can only
learn self-control by exercising their capacity for autonomy. Accountability for criminal behavior may facilitate legal socialization and moral development in ways that juvenile courts'
rejection of criminal responsibility cannot.

would be fatally impaired unless the law provided a locus poenitentiae,a point of
no return beyond which external constraints may be imposed but before which
the individual is free-not free of whatever compulsions determinists tell us he labors under but free of the very specific social compulsions of the law.
HERBERT PACKER, THE IMITS OF THE CRuNAL SANCCION 74-75 (1968).
"' GoLDsIN, supra note 152, at 224.
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4. Integrated CriminalJustice System

A graduated age-culpability sentencing scheme in an integrated criminal justice system avoids the inconsistencies and injustices associated with the binary either-juvenile-or-adult drama
currently played out in judicial waiver proceedings and in
prosecutorial charging decisions. It also avoids the "punishment gap" when youths make the transition from the one justice
system to the other. Depending upon whether or not ajudge or
prosecutor transfers a case, the sentences that violent youths receive may differ by orders of magnitude. Moreover, appellate
courts eschew proportionality analyses and allow criminal court
judges to sentence waived youths to the same terms applied to
adults without requiring them to consider or recognize any differences in their degree of criminal responsibility. By contrast,
waived chronic property offenders typically receive less severe
sanctions as adults than they would have received as persistent
offenders in the juvenile system. As the sentencing principles of
juvenile courts increasingly resemble more closely those of
criminal courts, the sentence disparities that follow from waiver
decisions become even less defensible. Because of the "life and
death" consequences at stake, transfer hearings consume a disproportionate amount ofjuvenile court time and energy.
An integrated criminal justice system eliminates the need
for transfer hearings, saves the considerable resources that juvenile courts currently expend ultimately to no purpose, reduces the "punishment gap" that presently occurs when youths
make the passage from the juvenile system, and assures similar
consequences for similarly situated offenders. Adolescence and
criminal careers develop along a continuum. But the radical bifurcation between the two justice systems confounds efforts to
respond consistently and systematically to young career offenders.
A sliding-scale of criminal sentences based on an offender's
age-as-a-proxy-for-culpability accomplishes much more directly
what the various "blended jurisdiction" statutes attempt to
achieve indirectly. The variants of "intermediate" sanctions attempt to reconcile the binary alternatives of either a sentence
limited by juvenile court age jurisdiction or a dramatically
longer criminal sentence imposed upon a youth as an adult.
While those statutes attempt to smooth the juncture between
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the two systems, the existence of two separate systems thwarts
the fusion.
5. IntegratedRecord Keeping

The absence of an integrated record keeping system that
enables criminal court judges to identify and respond to career
offenders on the basis of their cumulative prior record constitutes one of the most pernicious consequences of jurisdictional
bifurcation. Currently, persistent young offenders may "fall between the cracks" of the juvenile and criminal systems, often at
the age at which career offenders approach their peak offending rates. A unified criminal court with a single record keeping
system can maintain and retrieve more accurate criminal histories when a judge sentences an offender.'56 Although a "youth
discount" provides appropriate leniency for younger offenders,
integrated records would allow courts to escalate the discounted
sanctions for chronic and career young offenders.
6. Decriminalize "Kids'Stuff'

Despite juvenile courts' overcrowded dockets and inadequate treatment resources, their procedural deficiencies and informality allow them to process delinquents too efficiently.
Expedited procedures, fewer lawyers and legal challenges, and
greater flexibility allows juvenile courts to handle a much larger
number of cases per judge than do criminal courts and at lower
unit cost.'
Merging the two systems would introduce an enormous volume of cases into an already over-burdened criminal
justice system that barely can cope with its current workload.
Legislators and prosecutors forced to allocate scarce law en"' State laws can relieve young offenders from the collateral consequence of an isolated criminal conviction. Some research indicates that an arrest record and criminal
justice system involvement adversely affects youths' employment prospects and further restricts their access to legitimate labor markets. LOOSING GENERATIONS, supra
note 46, at 166; MERCER L. SULuVAN, "GETtiNG PAID": YOUTH CRIME AND WORK IN THE

INNER Cnr 251-55 (1989); Richard B. Freeman, Employment and Earnings of Disadvantaged Youth in a Labor Shortage Economy, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 103 (Christopher

Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., 1991). Although criminal sentencing authorities require
access to records of prior convictions to identify chronic and career offenders,
younger first offenders need not suffer all of the disabilities and losses of rights typically associated with criminal convictions. A legislature can nullify the effects of a felony conviction upon completion of sentence and supervision.
117
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 2, at 132-37; Feld, Viwlent Youth, supra note 2, at
1097-21.
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forcement resources would use the seriousness of the offense to
rationalize charging decisions and "divert" or "decriminalize"
most of the "kids' stuff' that provides the grist of the juvenile
court mill until it became chronic or escalated in severity. 158 Unlike a rehabilitative system inclined to extend its benevolent
reach, an explicitly punitive process would opt to introduce
fewer and more criminally "deserving" youths into the system.
Z SentencingExpertise
Contemporary proponents of a specialized juvenile court
contend that juvenile court judges require substantial time and
commitment to become familiar with youth development, family dynamics, and community resources, and cite judges' dispositional expertise as a justification for a separate justice system. 9
Whether juvenile court judges actually acquire such expertise
remains unclear. In many jurisdictions, non-specialist judges
handle juvenile matters as part of their general trial docket or
rotate through a juvenile court on short term assignments without developing any special expertise in sentencing juveniles. 1 °
Even in specialized juvenile courts, the court services personnel,
rather than the judge herself, typically possess the information
necessary to recommend appropriate sentences.

" CompareFeld, Niolent Youth, supra note 2, at 1108-21 (state statute extends nonwaivable right to counsel to juveniles), with Melissa M. Weldon, Note, Fiscal Restraints
Trump Due Process: Children'sDiminishingRight to Counsel in Minnesota, 14 LAW & INEQ.
J. 647, 668 (1996) (after law guaranteed representation by counsel, legislature
amended statute and "decriminalized" juvenile misdemeanors as a cost-saving strategy). The well-documented phenomenon of "desistance" suggests that most young
offenders spontaneously abandon their tentative criminal involvements and accounts
for most of the "success" of diversion and informal probation. See MARVIN WOLFGANG
ETAL., DEINQUENCYINABIRTH COHORT (1972).
'5'See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 54, at 36.
" Rubin, supra note 52, at 296; see also Edwards, supra note 54. An integrated
criminal court that functions primarily as a court of law reduces the need for a specialized judiciary trained in principles of social work. Trying young people with full
procedural safeguards would not especially diminish judges' expertise about appropriate dispositions for young people. Even if a court convicts a youth, probation staff
may conduct a presentence investigation and advise the judge as to the appropriate
sentence. Within the range of sentence lengths determined by the offense and reduced by the "youth discount," courts still could provide young offenders with whatever social or welfare services they deem appropriate.
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8. Age-segregatedDispositionalFacilitiesand "Room to Reform"
Questions about young offenders' criminal responsibility
and length of sentence differ from issues about appropriate
places of confinement or the services or resources the state
should provide to them. Even explicitly punitive sentences do
not require judges or correctional authorities to confine young
people with adults in jails and prisons, as is the current practice
for waived youths, 161 or to consign them to custodial warehouses
States should maintain separate ageor "punk prisons."
segregated youth correctional facilities to protect both younger
offenders and older inmates. Even though youths may be
somewhat responsible for their criminal conduct, they may not
be the physical or psychological equals of adults in prison.
While some youths may be vulnerable to victimization or exploitation by more physically developed adults, other youths may
pose a threat to older inmates. Younger offenders have not
learned to "do easy time," pose more management problems for
correctional administrators, and commit more disciplinary infractions while they serve their sentences. 62 Existing juvenile
detention facilities, training schools, and institutions provide
the option to segregate inmates on the basis of age or other risk
factors. Some research indicates that youths sentenced to juvenile correctional facilities may recidivate somewhat less often,
seriously, or rapidly than comparable youths sentenced to adult
facilities. 6 3 However, these findings provide modest support for
161See

supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text; TORBET ET

AL.,

supra note 16, at

25-27.
162A study of prison rule violations reported that "[a] ge was the prisoner characteristic that related most directly to prison rule violation... [and] the younger the age
category, the larger the percentage of inmates charged with rule violations." BUREAU
OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON RULE VIOLATORS 2 (1989). See also LIS, INC., OFFENDERS
UNDERAGE 18 IN STATE ADULT CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS: A NATIONAL PICTURE 4 (1995).

One study of prison adjustment compared a sample of waived youths sentenced to
the Texas Department of Corrections for violent crimes committed before the age of
17 with a matched sample of incarcerated inmates aged 17 to 21 at the time of their
offenses. By every measure, the waived violent youths adapted less well, accumulated
more extensive disciplinary histories, earned less good time, experienced higher custody classification, committed more assaults, and required extra security measures.
Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams, III, The Prison Adjustment ofJuvenile Offenders, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 254 (1989).
6' SeeJeffrey Fagan, Separatingthe Men from the Boys: The ComparativeAdvantage ofJuvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism amongAdolescent Felony Offenders, in A
SOURCEBOOK: SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 238 (James C.
Howell et al. eds., 1995); Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal
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a separate youth correctional system rather than for an entirely
separate juvenile justice system.
Virtually all young offenders return to society, and the state
should provide them with resources for self-improvement on a
voluntary basis because of its basic responsibility to its citizens
and its own self-interest. If a state fails to provide opportunities
for growth and further debilitates already disadvantaged youths,
it guarantees greater long-term human, criminal, and correctional costs. A sentencing and correctional policy that offers
young offenders "room to reform," opportunities, and resources
does not covertly reinstate a treatment ideology, but facilitates
young offenders' constructive use of their time. With maturity,
most young offenders develop a capacity for self-control and desist from criminality. Providing them with opportunities to reform requires more than custodial warehousing. Education,
social services, and economic training may contribute to personal growth and perhaps improve the life chances of adolescents at risk even if they do not demonstrably reduce recidivism
rates. Although the state bears an obligation to provide the
means and incentives for personal change, the length of a
youth's sentence should not depend fundamentally on either
clinically perceived "real needs" or apparent responsiveness to
"coerced treatment."16
V.

SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS:

LET'S BE HONEST ABOUTYOUTH CRIME CONTROL

Law reforms that tinker with the boundaries of childhood
or modify judicial procedures do not appear to reduce appreciably offenders' probabilities of recidivism or increase public
Court: Reexamining Recidivism Over the Longer Term, 43 CRIME & DEuNQ. 548 (1997)
(long-term recidivism survival analysis reported that police rearrested transferred juveniles more quickly and more often than retained juveniles); Donna Bishop et al.,
The TransferofJuveniles to Criminal Court:Does It Make a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DEuNQ.
171 (1996) (comparison of recidivism rates of waived youths with matched sample of
retained juveniles reported more favorable outcomes for the latter); Jeffrey Fagan,
The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism
Among Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POLY 77 (1996) (compared recidivism rates of 15
and 16-year-old robbery and burglary offenders sentenced as adults in New York with
a comparable sample of youths sentenced as juveniles in contiguous counties in New
Jersey).
"'One can uncouple social welfare from criminal social control, and divorce
treatment from punishment only by providing the opportunity for change on a voluntary basis. See.AMERICAN FR]ENDS SERVICE CoMM., STRuGGLE FORJuSnCE 171 (1997).
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safety. Even far-reaching justice system changes can have only a
marginal impact on social problems as complex as crime and
violence. Rather, a proposal to abolish the juvenile court and to
try all young offenders in an integrated justice system makes no
utilitarian claims, but represents a commitment to honesty
about state coercion. States bring young offenders who commit
crimes to juvenile court for social control and to punish them.
Juvenile courts' rehabilitative claims fly in the face of their penal
reality, undermine their legitimacy, and impair their ability to
function as judicial agencies. Because punishment is an unpleasant topic, juvenile courts attempt to evade those disagreeable qualities by obscuring their reality with rehabilitative
euphemisms, psycho-babble, and judicial "double-speak" like
"sometimes punishment is treatment."
The shortcomings of the "rehabilitative" juvenile court run
far deeper than inadequate resources and rudimentary and unproven treatment techniques. Rather, the flaw lies in the very
idea that the juvenile court can combine successfully criminal
social control and social welfare in one system. Similarly, a
separate "criminal" juvenile court cannot succeed or long survive because it lacks a coherent rationale to distinguish it from a
"real" criminal court.'6 A scaled-down separate criminal court
for youths simply represents a temporary way-station on the
road to substantive and procedural convergence with the criminal court. Only an integrated criminal justice that formally recognizes adolescence as a developmental continuum may
effectively address many of the problems created by our binary
conceptions of youth and social control.
Enhanced procedural protections, a "youth discount" of
sentences, and age-segregated dispositional facilities recognize
and respond to the "real" developmental differences between
young people and adult offenders in the justice system. Because
these policy proposals require state legislators courageous
enough to adopt them, several thoughtful commentators question whether elected public officials in a "get tough" political
climate would make explicit the leniency implicit in the con-

165See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 182-85; Melton, supra note 34, at 177-80

(proposing a "criminal" juvenile court with adult procedural safeguards and shorter
sentences in a separate justice system).
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temporary juvenile court.1r While the public unknowingly may
tolerate nominal sanctions administered to young offenders in
low visibility juvenile proceedings, politicians may balk at openly
acknowledging a policy of moderation. Many elected officials
prefer to demagogue about crime and posture politically to
"crack down" on youth crime rather than to responsibly educate
the public about the realistic limits of the justice system to control it. Some would rather fan the flames of fear for political
advantage despite overwhelming evidence that escalating rates
of imprisonment represent a failed policy that ultimately leads
only to fiscal and moral bankruptcy.
I propose to abolish the juvenile court with trepidation. On
the one hand, combining enhanced procedural safeguards with
a "youth discount" in an integrated criminal court can provide
young offenders with greater protections and justice than they
currently receive in the juvenile system, and more proportional
and humane consequences than judges presently inflict on
them in the criminal justice system. Integration may foster a
more consistent crime control response than the present dual
systems permit to violent and chronic young offenders at various
stages of the developmental and criminal career continuum.
On the other hand, politicians may ignore the significance of
youthfulness as a mitigating factor and use these proposals to
escalate the punishment of young people. Although abolition
of the juvenile court, enhanced procedural protections, and a
"youth discount" constitute essential components of a youth
sentencing policy package,167 nothing can prevent legislators
from selectively choosing only those elements that serve their
"get tough" agenda, even though doing so unravels the threads
that make coherent a proposal for an integrated court.
In either event, the ensuing debate about a youth sentencing policy would require them to consider whether to focus
primarily on the fact that young offenders are young or offenders.
A public policy debate about when the child is a criminal and
"' Rosenberg, for example, questions whether legislators who fail to provide juveniles even with procedural parity in the current "benevolent" juvenile justice system
would provide youths with greater safeguards after they merged them into a unified
criminal system. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 175. Bernard argues that a policy of
leniency as crime control would be difficult to sell to "law and order" politicians.
THOM.sJ. BERNARD, CYCLE OFJUv ENELEJuScE 181-82 (1992).
"'Feld, Violent Youth, supranote 2, at 1004.
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the criminal is a child forces a long overdue and critical reassessment of the entire social construction of "childhood." To
what extent do adolescents really differ from adults? To what
extent do differences in competency and judgment result from
physical or psychological developmental processes, or from social arrangements and institutions that systematically disable
young people? If politicians ultimately insist upon treating
young people primarily as offenders and the equals of adults,
can they simultaneously maintain without contradiction other
age-graded legal distinctions such as denial of the right to vote
or to exercise self-determination?
The idea of the juvenile court is fundamentally flawed because it attempts to combine criminal social control and social
welfare goals. My proposal to abolish the juvenile court does
not entail an abandonment of its welfare ideal. Rather, uncoupling policies of social welfare from penal social control enables
us to expand a societal commitment to the welfare of all children regardless of their criminality. If we frame child welfare
policy reforms in terms of child welfare rather than crime control, then we may expand the possibilities for positive intervention for all young people. For example, a public health
approach to youth crime that identified the social, environmental, community structural, and ecological correlates of
youth violence, such as poverty, the proliferation of handguns,
and the commercialization of violence, would suggest wholly
different intervention strategies than simply incarcerating minority youths. Youth violence occurs as part of a social ecological structure; high rates of violent youth crime arise in areas of
concentrated poverty, high teenage pregnancy, and AFDC dependency.'6 Such social indicators could identify census tracts
or even zip-codes for community organizing, economic development, and preventive and remedial intervention.
Three aspects of youth crime and violence suggest future
social welfare policy directions regardless of their immediate
impact on recidivism. First, it is imperative to provide a hopeful
futurefor all young people. As a result of structural and economic
changes since the 1980s, the ability of families to raise children,
See generally WHILAMJULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996); DOUGLAS
MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993); LOSING GENERATIONS, supra
note 46; WILLIAMJULUUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
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to prepare them for the transition to adulthood, and to provide
them with a more promising future has declined. 169 Many social
indicators of the status of young people-poverty, homelessness,
violent victimization, and crime-are negative and some of
those adverse trends are accelerating. Without realistic hope
for their future, young people fall into despair, nihilism, and
17
violenceY.
Second, the disproportionate over-representation of
minority youths in the juvenile justice system makes imperative
the pursuit of racial and social justice. A generation ago, the
Kerner Commission warned that the United States was "moving
toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal.' 7' The Kerner Commission predicted that to continue
present policies was "to make permanent the division of our
country into two societies; one, largely Negro and poor, located
in the central cities; the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs." 72 Today, we reap the bitter harvest
of racial segregation, concentrated poverty, urban social disintegration, and youth violence sown by social policies and public
neglect a generation ago. 73 Third, youth violence has become
increasingly lethal as the proliferation of handguns transforms
adolescent altercations into homicidal encounters. 7 4 Only public policies that reduce and reverse the proliferation of guns in
the youth population will stem the carnage.
While politicians may be unwilling to invest scarce social resources in young "criminals," particularly those of other colors
or cultures, a demographic shift and an aging population give
all of us a stake in young people and encourage us to invest in
'69See generally BEYOND RHEToRIc, supra note 47;
46.

170BEYOND

LOSING GENERATIONS, supra note

RHETORIC, supra note 47; Grisso, supranote 80, at 234 (summarizing re-

search on youth violence by noting that "[n]umerous studies describe the sense of
'futurelessness' and fatalism that is experienced by adolescents whose dependent
status does not allow them to escape neighborhoods in which violent death is a daily
occurrence, and they consider that many urban youths who murder believe that there
is no future to consider.").
171REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968)
(Kemer Commission Report).
"7

WILSON, TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 168; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note

168.
'74Young people committed three-quarters of homicides with firearms, and only a
policy of systematic disarmament will begin to stem the tide. See generally Blumstein,
supranote 22; Blumstein & Cork, supra note 22; Zimring, supra note 22.
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their human capital for their and our own future well-being and
to maintain an inter-generational compact.' 5 Social welfare and
legal policies to provide all young people with a hopeful future,
to reduce racial and social inequality, and to reduce access to
and use of firearms require a public and political commitment
to the welfare of children that extends far beyond the resources
or competencies of any juvenile justice system.

17"
One generation ago, the elderly constituted the largest segment of the population in poverty, and public policies such as social security, SSI, and medicare dramatically improved their material conditions. Today, children constitute the largest
segment of the population in poverty, and the youngest, minorities, and those living
in single-parent families experience the greatest penury. See LOSING GENERATIONS, su-

pra note 46, at 41-63. Social security-like public policies can provide for child health
and welfare, lift young people out of poverty, and ease the transition from adolescence to productive adulthood for considerably less than the annual costs of "bailing
out" the savings and loan industry. See LaNDSEY, supra note 47, at 229-56.

